IN
THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
(Dyett
v. Turner, 439 P2d 266 @ 269, 20 U2d 403 [1968])
THE
NON-RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(Judge
A.H. Ellett)
The method of
amending the U.S. Constitution is provided for in Article V of
the original document. No other method will accomplish
this purpose. That Article provides as follows:
`The Congress,
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application
of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or
the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;'
The Civil war had
to be fought to determine whether the Union indissoluble and whether
any State could secede or withdraw there from. The issue was settled
first on the field of battle by force of arms, and second by the
pronouncement of the highest court of the land. In the case of State
of Texas v. White, /
it was claimed that Texas having seceded from the Union and severed
her relationship with a majority of the States of the Union, and
having by her Ordinance of Secession attempted to throw off
her allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, had
thus disabled herself
from prosecuting a
suit in the Federal Courts. In speaking on this point the Court at
page 726, 19 L.Ed. 227 held:
`When, therefore, Texas became one of the United
States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the
obligations of perpetual union, and all the guarantees of republican
government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act
which consummated her admission into the Union was something more
than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the
political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and
the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble
as the union between the original States. There was no place for
reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or
through consent of the States.
`Considered therefore as transactions under the
Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the
convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas,
and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that
ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation
in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and
of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States,
remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State
did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the
Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become
foreign, and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased
to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a
war for conquest of subjugation.
`Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to
be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the
transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our
judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any
department of the National government, but entirely in accordance
with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first
out break of the rebellion.'
It is necessary to review the historical background to
understand how the Fourteenth Amendment came to be a
part of our U.S. Constitution.
General Lee had surrendered his Army on April 9,
1865, and General Johnston surrendered his 17 days later.
Within a period of less than six weeks thereafter, not one
Confederate soldier was bearing arms. By June 30, 1865, the
Confederate States were all restored by Presidential Proclamation
to their proper positions as States in an indissoluble Union, /
and practically all Citizens thereof. /
A few Citizens were excepted from the Amnesty
Proclamation, such, for example, as Civil or Diplomatic
Officers of the late Confederate government and all of the
seceding States; United States Judges, members of
Congress and commissioned Officers of the United States Army and Navy
who left their posts to aid the rebellion: Officers in the
Confederate military forces above the rank of Colonel in the Army
and Lieutenant in the Navy; all who resigned commissions in the
Army or Navy of the United States to assist the rebellion;
and all Officers of the military forces of the Confederacy who
had been educated at the military or naval academy of
the United States, etc., etc., had been
granted amnesty. Immediately thereafter, each of the
seceding States functioned as regular States in the Union with
both State and Federal Courts in full operation.
President Lincoln had declared the freedom of
the slaves as a war measure, but when the war ended, the
effect of the Proclamation was ended, and so it was
necessary to propose and to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment in
order to insure the freedom of the slaves.
The 11 southern States, having taken their rightful and
necessary place in the indestructible Union, proceeded to
determine whether to ratify or reject the
proposed Thirteenth Amendment.
In order for the Thirteenth Amendment to become
a part of the Constitution, it was necessary that the proposed
Amendment be ratified by 27 of the 36 States. Among those
27 States ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment were 10
from the South, to wit, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas,
South Carolina, Alabama, North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi,
Florida, and Texas.
When the 39th Congress assembled on December 5,
1865, the Senators and Representatives from the 25 northern States
voted to deny seats in both Houses of Congress to anyone elected
from the 11 southern States. The full complement
of Senators from the 36 States of the Union was 72, and the
full membership in the House was 240. Since it requires only a
majority vote /
to refuse a seat in Congress, only the 50 Senators and 182
Congressmen from the North were seated. All of the 22 Senators
and 58 Representatives from the southern States were denied
seats.
Joint Resolution No. 48, proposing the
Fourteenth Amendment, was a matter of great concern to the
Congress and to the people of the Nation. In order to have this
proposed Amendment submitted to the 36 States for
ratification, it was necessary that two thirds of each House
concur. A count of noses showed that only 33 Senators were favorable
to the measure, and 33 was a far cry from two thirds of 72 and
lacked one of being two thirds of the 50 seated Senators.
While it requires only a majority of votes to refuse a
seat to a Senator, it requires a two thirds majority to unseat a
member once he is seated. /
One John P. Stockton was seated on December 5,
1865, as one of the Senators from New Jersey. He was outspoken
in his opposition to Joint Resolution No. 48 proposing
the Fourteenth Amendment. The leadership in the Senate,
not having control of two thirds of the seated Senators,
voted to refuse to seat Mr. Stockton upon the ground that he
had received only a plurality and not a majority of the votes of the
New Jersey legislature. It was the law of New Jersey, and
several other States, that a plurality vote was sufficient for
election. Besides, the Senator had already been seated.
Nevertheless, his seat was -refused- and the 33 favorable
votes thus became the required two thirds of the 49 members of the
Senate.
In the House of Representatives, it would require 122
votes to be two thirds of the 182 members seated. Only 120
voted for the proposed Amendment, but because there
were 30 abstentions, it was declared to have been passed by
a two thirds vote of the House.
Whether it requires two thirds of the full membership
of both Houses to propose an Amendment to the Constitution or
only two thirds of those seated or two thirds of those voting is
a question which it would seem could only be determined by the
United States Supreme Court. However, it is perhaps not so
important for the reason that the Amendment is only -proposed-
by Congress. It must be -ratified- by three fourths of
the States in the Union before it becomes a part of the
Constitution. The method of securing the passage through Congress is
set out above, as it throws some light on the means used to obtain
ratification by the States thereafter.
Nebraska had been admitted to the Union and so the
Secretary of State, in transmitting the proposed Amendment,
announced that ratification by 28 States would be needed before
the Amendment would become part of the Constitution since there
were at the time 37 States in the Union. A rejection by 10
States would thus defeat the proposal.
By March 17, 1867; the proposed Amendment had
been ratified by 17 States and rejected by 10 with California
voting to take no action thereon which was equivalent to rejection,
thus the proposal was defeated.
One of the ratifying States, Oregon; had
ratified by a membership wherein two legislators were
subsequently held not to be duly elected, and after the contest,
the duly elected members of the legislature of Oregon rejected
the proposed Amendment. However, this rejection came after
the Amendment was declared passed.
Despite the fact that the southern States had been
functioning peacefully for two years and had been counted to
secure ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress
passed the Reconstruction Act [March 2, 1867],
which provided for the military occupation of 10 of the 11 southern
States. It excluded Tennessee from military occupation and one must
suspect it was because Tennessee had ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment on July 7, 1866.
The "Act" further disfranchised
practically all white voters and provided that no Senator
or Congressman from the occupied States could be seated in
Congress until a new Constitution was adopted by each State which
would be approved by Congress. The "Act"
further provided that each of the 10 States was required to ratify
the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and
the Fourteenth Amendment must become a part of
the Constitution of the United States before the
military occupancy would cease and the States be allowed to have
seats in Congress.
By the time the Reconstruction Act had been
declared to be the law; three more States had ratified the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment and two States, Louisiana
and Delaware, had rejected it. Maryland then withdrew its prior
ratification and rejected the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.
Ohio followed suit and withdrew its prior ratification, as also
did New Jersey and California, (which earlier had voted not
to pass upon the proposal), now voted to reject the Amendment.
Thus 16 of the 37 States had rejected the proposed Amendment.
By spurious, non-representative governments; seven of
the southern States, (which had theretofore rejected the
proposed Amendment under the duress of military occupation and
of being denied representation in Congress), did attempt to
ratify the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary
of State, (of July 20, 1868), issued his Proclamation
wherein he stated that it was his duty under the law to cause
Amendments to be published and certified as a part of the
Constitution when he received official notice that they had been
adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Thereafter his
certificate contained the following language:
`And whereas neither the Act just quoted from, nor any
other law, expressly or by conclusive implication., authorizes the
Secretary of State to determine and decide doubtful questions as to
the authenticity of the organization of State legislatures, or as to
the power of any State legislature to recall a previous act or
resolution of ratification of any amendment proposed to the
Constitution;
`And whereas it appears from official documents on file
in this Department that the amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, proposed as aforesaid, has been ratified by the
legislatures of the States of [naming 23, including New Jersey, Ohio,
and Oregon];
`And whereas it further appears from documents on file
in this Department that the amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, proposed as aforesaid, has also been ratified by
newly constituted and newly established bodies avowing themselves to
be and acting as the legislatures, respectively, of the States of
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina,
and Alabama;
`And whereas it further appears from official documents
on file in this Department that the legislatures of two of the States
first above enumerated, to wit, Ohio and New Jersey, have since
passed resolutions respectively withdrawing the consent of each of
said States to the aforesaid amendment; and whereas it is deemed a
matter of doubt and uncertainty whether such resolutions are not
irregular, invalid, and therefore ineffectual for withdrawing the
consent of the said two States, or of either of them, to the
aforesaid amendment;
`And whereas the whole number of States in the United
States is thirty-seven, to wit: [naming them];
`And whereas the twenty-three States first hereinbefore
named, whose legislatures have ratified the said proposed amendment,
and the six States next there after named, as having ratified the
said proposed amendment by newly constituted and established
legislative bodies, together constitute three fourths of the whole
number of States in the United States;
`Now, therefore, be it known that I, WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State of the United States, by virtue and in
pursuant of the second section of the act of Congress, approved the
twentieth of April, eighteen hundred and eighteen, hereinbefore
cited, do hereby certify that if the resolutions of the legislatures
of Ohio and New Jersey ratifying the aforesaid amendment are to be
deemed as remaining of full force and effect, notwithstanding the
subsequent resolutions of the legislatures of those States, which
purport to withdraw the consent of said States from such
ratification, then the aforesaid amendment had been ratified in the
manner hereinbefore mentioned, and so has become valid, to all
intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United
States." * * * /
Congress was not satisfied with the Proclamation as
issued and on the next day passed a Concurrent Resolution
wherein it was resolved:
`That said Fourteenth Article is hereby declared to be a
part of the Constitution of the United States, and it shall be duly
promulgated as such by the Secretary of State.'
Resolution set forth in
Proclamation of Secretary of State,
(15 Stat. 709 [1868]).
See also U.S.C.A., Amends. 1 to 5, Constitution, p.
11.
Thereupon; William H. Seward, the Secretary of
State (after setting forth the Concurrent Resolution
of both Houses of Congress) then certified that the Amendment:
`Has become valid to all intents and purposes as a part
of the Constitution of the United States.' /
The Constitution of the United States is silent as to
who should decide whether a proposed Amendment has or has not been
passed according to formal provisions of Article V
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United
States is the ultimate authority on the meaning of the Constitution
and has never hesitated in a proper case to declare an `Act'
of Congress "unconstitutional" - except when the
`Act' purported to amend the Constitution.
In the case of Leser v. Garnett, /
the question was before the Supreme Court as to whether or not
the Nineteenth Amendment had been ratified pursuant to
the Constitution. In the last paragraph of the decision the
Supreme Court said:
`As the legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia
had power to adopt the resolutions of ratification, official notice
to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they had done so, was
conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is
conclusive upon the courts.'
The duty of the Secretary of State was ministerial, to
wit, to count and determine when three fourths of the States had
ratified the proposed Amendment. He could not determine that
a State, once having rejected a proposed Amendment, could
thereafter approve it; nor could he determine that a State, once
having ratified that proposal, could thereafter reject it. The
Supreme Court, and not Congress, should determine whether the
Amendment process be final or would not be final, whether the
first vote was for ratification or rejection.
In order to have 27 States ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was necessary to count those States which had
first rejected and then under the duress of military occupation
had ratified, and then also to count those States which
initially ratified but subsequently rejected the proposal.
To leave such dishonest counting to a fractional part
of Congress is dangerous in the extreme. What is to prevent any
political party having control of both Houses of Congress from
refusing to seat the opposition and then passing a Joint
Resolution to the effect that the Constitution is amended and
that it is the duty of the Administrator of the General
Services Administration [now the Archivist of the
United States] to proclaim the adoption? Would the Supreme
Court of the United States still say the problem was political and
refuse to determine whether constitutional standards had been met?
[Yes - Epperly et. al. v. United States /].
How can it be conceived in the minds of anyone that a
combination of powerful States can by force of arms deny another
State a right to have representation in Congress until it has
ratified an Amendment which its people oppose? [And by what
authority does any States (or combination thereof) claim to
declare a sister State to have an invalid government?] The
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted by means almost as bad as
that suggested above.
"For a more detailed account of how the Fourteenth
Amendment was forced upon the Nation, see Articles in 11
S.C.L.Q. 484 and 28 Tul.L.Rev. 22."
/
/ / / / /
/
/ / / / /
/
/ / / / /
The
Reconstruction Acts
Introduction
The Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution for the United States was
questioned before the Courts of the United States in the case of
Gordon Epperly et. al. v. United States /
wherein each of those Courts ruled within un-published
Opinions/Judgments that the questions raised were
“political questions” to the Courts
(citing Coleman v. Miller /
and United States v. Stahl /).
Prior to 1939, the
Supreme Court for the United States had taken cognizance of a number
of diverse objections to the validity of specific amendments. Apart
from holding that official notice of ratification by the several
States was conclusive upon the courts, /
it had treated these questions as justiciable, although it had
uniformly rejected them on the merits. In that year, however, the
whole subject was thrown into confusion by the inconclusive decision
of Coleman v. Miller. /
This case came up on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Kansas to review the denial of a writ of mandamus
to compel the Secretary of the Kansas Senate to erase an endorsement
on a Resolution ratifying the proposed child labor
Amendment to the Constitution of the
effect that it had been adopted by the Kansas Senate.
Four opinions were
written in the U.S. Supreme Court, no one of which commanded the
support of more than four members of the Court. The majority ruled
that the Plaintiffs, members of the Kansas State Senate, had a
sufficient interest in the controversy to give the federal courts
jurisdiction to review the case. Without agreement with regard to
the grounds for their decision, a different majority affirmed the
judgment of the Kansas court denying the relief sought. Four members
who concurred in the result had voted to dismiss the writ on the
ground that the amending process “is ‘political’ in
its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of
the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
interference at any point.”/
In an opinion reported as “the opinion of the Court,” but
in which it appears that only two Justices joined Chief Justice
Hughs who wrote it, it was declared that the writ of
mandamus was properly denied, because the question whether a
reasonable time had elapsed since submission of the proposal was a
nonjusticiable political question, the kinds of considerations
entering into deciding being fit for Congress to evaluate, and the
question of the effect of a previous rejection upon a ratification
was similarly nonjusticiable, because the 1868 Fourteenth
Amendment precedent of congressional determination
“has been accepted.” /
But with respect to the contention that the lieutenant governor
should not have been permitted to cast the deciding vote in favor of
ratification, the Court found itself evenly divided, thus
accepting the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court that the
state officer had acted validly. /
However, the unexplained decision by Chief Justice Hughes
and his two concurring Justices that the issue of
the lieutenant’ governor’s vote was justiciable
indicates at the least that their position was in disagreement with
the view of the other four Justices in the majority that all
questions surrounding Constitutional Amendments are nonjusticiable.
/
However, Coleman
does stand as authority for the proposition that at least some
decisions with respect to the proposal and ratification of
Constitutional Amendments are exclusively within the purview of
Congress or the States, either because they are textually committed
or because the Courts lack adequate criteria of determination to pass
on them. /
But to what extent the political question doctrine encompasses the
amendment process and what the standards may be to resolve that
particular issue remain elusive of answers.
We can conclude
from the cases of Epperly et. al. v. United States
(supra.) that the United States Supreme Court has made a
determination that any constitutional questions regarding the
amending of the U.S. Constitution are "political questions"
for the Congress or the States to address.
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
Historical
Background
The historical
facts relating to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
have been addressed by the Supreme Court for the State of Utah in the
case of Dyett v. Turner; (supra.)
/
State v. Phillips; /
and the legal brief of Judge Lander H. Perez of
Louisiana as published in the Congressional Record. /
It should be noted
that the U.S. Supreme Court declared within the case of State of
Texas v. White, /
that a State cannot secede from the Union after being admitted into
the Union. The Supreme Court further ruled that the southern States
were States of the Union before the Civil War, the
southern States were States of the Union during the Civil War
and the southern States were States of the Union after the Civil War.
Your attention is
also called that at the time the Civil War was declared to be at
an end, the southern States were operating under proper
civil governments when the present day Thirteenth Amendment
was submitted to those States for ratification. /
The Problem
For the purpose of
discussion, we will concentrate on the House Joint Resolution
that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and the
Proclamations of Ratification by Secretary of State,
William H. Seward.
Note:
In regard to the
Fourteenth Amendment; the Record of the
“Congressional Globe” refers to the
“Joint Resolution” proposing the Amendment as
being H.J.R. 127. The copy of the
“Joint Resolution” that was submitted to the States
for Ratification was referred to as H.J.R. 48.
Hereinafter, we will refer to the “Joint Resolution”
as H.J.R. 48.
First:
Pretermitting the
ineffectiveness of “H.J.R. 48;” seventeen (17)
States (four (4) votes are questionable) out of the
then thirty-seven (37) States of the Union rejected the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment between the date of its submission
to the States by the Secretary of State on June 16, 1866 and
March 24, 1868 thereby further nullifying said Resolution
and making it impossible for its ratification by the constitutionally
required three-fourths of such States as shown by the rejections
thereof by the legislatures of the following States:
Texas
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on October 27, 1866
(House Journal 1866, pgs. 577-584 - Senate
Journal 1866, p. 471.).
Georgia
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on November 9, 1866
(House Journal 1866, pgs. 61-69 - Senate Journal
1866, pgs. 65-72.).
Florida rejected
the Fourteenth Amendment on December 6, 1866
(House Journal 1866, pgs. 75-80, 138, 144, 149-150
- Senate Journal 1866, pgs. 101-103, 111, 114,
133.).
Alabama
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 7, 1866
(House Journal 1866. pgs. 208-213 - Senate
Journal 1866, pgs. 182-183.).
North
Carolina rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on
December 14, 1866 (House Journal 1866 - 1867.
pgs. 182-185 - Senate Journal 1866-67,
pgs. 91-139).
Arkansas
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 17, 1866
(House Journal 1866, pp. 288-291 - Senate Journal
1866, p. 262.).
South
Carolina rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on
December 20, 1866 (House Journal 1866, p. 284
- Senate Journal 1866, p. 230.).
Kentucky
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 8, 1867
(House Journal 1867, pgs. 60-65 - Senate Journal
1867, pgs. 62-65.).
Virginia
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 9, 1867
(House Journal 1866-67, p. 108 - Senate Journal
1866-67, pgs. 101-103.).
Louisiana
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on February 9, 1867
(Joint Resolution as recorded on page 9 of the Acts
of the General Assembly, Second Session, January 28,
1867) (McPherson, "Reconstruction," p. 194; "Annual
Encyclopedia," p. 452.).
Delaware
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on February 7, 1867
(House Journal 1867, pgs. 223-226 - Senate
Journal 1867, pgs. 169, 175 176, 208.).
Maryland
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on March 23, 1867
(House Journal 1867, pgs. 1139-1141 - Senate
Journal 1867, p. 808.).
Mississippi
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 31, 1867
(Laws of Mississippi, 1866-1877, p. 734; House
Journal 1867, pgs. 201-202 - Senate Journal
1866, p 195-196) (McPherson, "Reconstruction," p.
194.).
Ohio
rescinded its Fourteenth Amendment ratification vote
on January 15, 1868 (House Journal 1868, pgs. 44-51 -
Senate Journal 1868, pgs. 33-39.).
New
Jersey rescinded its Fourteenth Amendment ratification
vote on March 24, 1868 (Minutes of the Assembly
1868, p. 743 - Senate Journal 1868, p. 356.).
California on March
3rd, 1868, the Assembly, with the Senate concurring, rejected the
Fourteenth Amendment (Journal of the Assembly
1867-68, p. 601).
Oregon
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment by the Senate on
October 6, 1868 and by the House on October 15, 1868
proclaiming the legislature that ratified the Amendment to have been
a "defacto" legislature (U.S. House
of Representatives, 40th Congress, 3rd session, Mis. Doc. No
12).
There is no
question that all of the southern States [which rejected
the Fourteenth Amendment] had legal constituted
governments; were fully recognized by the federal government and
were functioning as member States of the Union at the time of
their rejection.
Where a proposed
Amendment to the Federal Constitution has been rejected by more than
one-forth of the States, and rejections have been duly certified, a
State which has rejected the proposed Amendment may not change its
position, even if it might change its position while the Amendment
is still before the people. /
Second:
Several
“Reconstruction Acts” were passed by Congress
after the Civil War was proclaimed by the President of the
United States to be at an end. /
The “Reconstruction Acts” that
will be addressed are those that were enacted on March 2, 1867,
/
June 25, 1868, /
July 19, 1867, /
March 30, 1870. /
It is obvious that these “Reconstruction Acts”
were enacted into law over the veto of the President for the
purpose of coercing the southern States into rescinding their
vote of rejection of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Reconstruction
Act of March 2, 1867: /
“... and when
said State, by a vote of its legislature elected under said
constitution (state) , shall have adopted the amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Thirty-ninth
Congress, and known as article fourteen, and when said article
shall have become a part of the Constitution of the United States,
said State shall be declared entitled to representation
in Congress, . . .”
The Act
of June 25, 1868 /
to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina,
Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, to representation in
Congress at Section 1:
“That each of
the States of (naming them) shall entitled and admitted to
representation in Congress as a State of the Union when the
legislature of such State shall have duly ratified the amendment to
the Constitution of the United States proposed by the
Thirty-ninth Congress, and known as the article fourteen, . .
.”
The Act
of March 30, 1870 /
admitting the State of Texas to Representation in the Congress
of the United States [Preamble]:
“Whereas the
people of Texas has framed and adopted a constitution of State
government which is republican; and whereas the legislature of
Texas elected under said constitution has ratified
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution of
the United States; and whereas the performance of these several
acts in good faith is a condition precedent to the representation of
the State in Congress: . . .”
From these three
Acts of Congress, the questions must be asked: “By
what authority did the Congress rely upon to compel a State
to reverse its negative ratification vote?” And: “By
what authority did the Congress rely upon to compel a State
to ratify an Amendment to the Constitution for the United States?”
Third:
The Thirty-ninth
Congress declared at Section 1 of the
Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867
/
that:
“. . . That
said rebel States shall be divided into military districts
and made subject to the military authority of the United States .
. .”
and at Section
6 of the same Act:
“. . . any
civil governments which may exist therein shall be deemed
provisional only, and in all respects subject to the
paramount authority of the United States . . .”
and at Section
10 of the Reconstruction Act of
July 19, 1867: /
“That the
commander of any district named in said act (March 2, 1867)
shall have power . . . to suspend or remove from office, or from
the performance of official duties and the exercise of official
powers, any officer or person holding or exercising, or
professing to hold or exercise, any civil or military office
or duty in such district under any power, election,
appointment or authority derived from, or granted by, or claimed
under, any so-called State or the government thereof, or any
municipal or other division thereof . . .”
and at Section
10 of that Act:
“That no
district commander . . . or any of the officers or appointees acting
under them, shall be bound in his action by any opinion of any
civil officer of the United States.”
The above
Sections of the Reconstruction Acts
of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867 makes it very
clear that the southern States were under military law and were
without republican form of governments. The question must be asked:
“By what authority did the Thirty-ninth Congress
rely upon to impose military law upon those southern States after
those States were declared by “Presidential Proclamation”
of April 2, 1868 and “Presidential Proclamation”
of August 20, 1866 that the insurrection was at an end,
and that peace, order, tranquillity and civil authority existed
in and throughout the whole of the United States of America?”
Keep in mind that the military was originally sent into those
States by “Presidential Proclamation” to suppress
rebellion within those States, not by any Act
of Congress.
Fourth:
As Section
1 of the Reconstruction Act of
March 2, 1867, /
declares that the southern States had no legal governments:
“Whereas no
legal State governments or adequate protection for life or
property now exists in the rebel States of Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama,
Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas; . . .”
the question must
be asked: “When did the southern States have
legal governments?” The Congress answered the
question within: - "An Act to provide for the more
efficient Government of the Rebel States" /
and within the: - "Act to admit the States
of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida, to Representation in Congress" /
and within the: - "Act to admit the State of Texas
to Representation in the Congress of the United States" /
wherein the Congress declared that the southern States were not
to be recognized as "States" with lawful
civil governments until said States ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment. By the mouth of Congress; the purported votes cast
for the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment under
the Reconstruction Acts were cast by unlawful
governments of those southern States [military districts].
Fifth:
If the southern
States had no legal governments, as declared by Congress; additional
questions must be asked:
Why
did the Congress submit the Resolution proposing the
Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to the southern States for ratification?
Why
did the Congress accept the southern States "ratification
votes" on the Thirteenth Amendment?
Why
did the Congress submit the Resolution proposing the
Fourteenth Amendment to the southern States
for ratification?
As
both Houses of Congress passed Resolutions /
declaring that the Civil War was not waged in the spirit of
oppression nor for purpose of overthrowing or INTERFERING WITH
THE RIGHTS OF ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS OF THOSE STATES, why
did Congress wait until those southern States cast a "negative"
ratification vote on the Fourteenth Amendment before
declaring the civil governments of those States as being
unlawful?
Did the southern
States have lawful governments before the enactment of
the "Reconstruction Acts?"
When
a freely associated compact State of the united States of America
is declared to have an unlawful civil government by Congress and is
placed under "Military Law" - is that State
a "State" as that term is used in U.S.
Const., V:1:1?
When
a freely associated compact State of the united States of America
is placed under "Military Law" by the Congress - do
those States have a Republican form of government as they are to be
guaranteed under U.S. Const., IV:4:1?
Does
Congress have the authority to substitute the Republican form
of government of a freely associated compact State of the united
States of America with another form of government for the
purpose of compelling ratification of an Amendment to
the Constitution for the United States?
If
Congress has the "textually demonstrable commitment"
and thus has the exclusive and plenary powers to declare the
southern States to have unlawful civil governments - why did
Congress find the need to submit the "Reconstruction
Acts" to the President of the United States for
his signature, a procedure that is governed by U.S. Const., I:7:2?
Sixth:
With the United
States Supreme Court's Dred Scott v. Sanford, /
ruling that a Negro had no rights under the Constitution for the
United States to either obtain rights of citizenship or rights of
suffrage; the "Reconstruction Acts"
of 1867 fails on the following grounds:
The
"Reconstruction Acts" granted the
Negroes of the southern States the rights of holding public
office of Legislator and thus the U.S. Congress granted the Negro
population the status of "citizen" BEFORE
the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be an
Amendment to the United States Constitution. /
The "Reconstruction
Acts" granted the Negroes of the southern States
the rights of "suffrage" BEFORE the
Fifteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be an
Amendment to the United States Constitution. /
[The
Fifteenth Amendment is a formal declaration by
the Congress of the United States that the suffrage provisions
within the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 are
unconstitutional].
Seventh:
The
"Reconstruction Acts" also fails on the
following grounds:
The
Congress of the United States granted authority to
"Military Districts" of the United States
to ratify Amendments to the United States Constitution in violation
of U.S. Const., Article V. /
Denied
the southern States representation in Congress in violation of
Paragraph Two of Article V of the
Articles of Confederation. /
Denied
the people of the southern States the privilege of holding
an “Office of Trust” if they were excluded
under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
BEFORE the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed
to be an Amendment to the United States
Constitution. /
Denied
the people of the southern States the rights of "suffrage"
unless they were qualified under the Third Article of
the Fourteenth Amendment BEFORE
the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be an
Amendment to the United States Constitution. /
The "Reconstruction
Acts" fails as Congress had no Constitutional
authority to create governments within a freely associated
compact State of the united States of America that consisted
of "Aliens." /
Eighth:
William H.
Seward, as Secretary of State, expressed doubt as to whether
three-fourths of the required States had ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment (as shown by his Proclamation
of July 20, 1868. /)
Promptly; on July 21, 1868, a Concurrent
Resolution /
was adopted by the Senate and House of Representatives
declaring that three-fourths of the several States of the Union
had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. That Concurrent
Resolution; however, was not submitted to the President of
the United States for his approval as required by U.S. Const., I:7:3
and it included purported ratifications by the unlawful
puppet legislatures of five (5) States
(Arkansas, North Carolina, Louisiana,
South Carolina, and Alabama) which had previously rejected
the Fourteenth Amendment. /
This
Concurrent Resolution assumed to perform the
function of the Secretary of State in whom Congress (by
Act of April 20, 1818) had vested the function of issuing
such Proclamation declaring the ratification of
Constitutional Amendments.
The Secretary of
State bowed to the action of Congress and issued his Proclamation
on July 28, 1868 /
in which he stated that he was acting under the mandate of the
Congressional Act of July 21, 1868:
“Now, therefore,
be it known that I, William H. Seward, Secretary of State
of the United States, in execution of the aforesaid act, (April 20,
1818) and of the afore-said concurrent resolution of the
21st of July, 1868, and in conformance thereto,
do hereby direct the said proposed amendment (Fourteenth
Amendment) to the Constitution of the United States
to be published in the newspapers authorized to promulgate the laws
of the United States, and I do hereby certify that the said proposed
amendment has been adopted in the manner hereinbefore mentioned
by the States specified in the said concurrent
resolution, namely [naming them]; the States
thus specified being more than three fourths of the States of
the United States. . . . “
In regard to the
Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 -
By what authority did the Congress rely upon to make a
determination as to what States ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment?
As the power to
ratify Amendments to the Constitution for the United States is
with the several States of the Union, by what authority did the
Secretary of State, William H. Seward, rely upon to
declare that the Concurrent Resolution
of July 21, 1868 was an “Official Notice”
of ratification?
In regard to the
Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 -
By what authority did the Congress rely upon to perform the
function of the Secretary of State in whom Congress (by Act
of April 20, 1818) had vested the function of issuing
Proclamations declaring the ratification of
Constitutional Amendments?
In regard to the
Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 -
By what authority did the Congress rely upon to declare that
the Secretary of State shall issue forth the Proclamation
of Ratification of July 28, 1868 /
when the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868
was never submitted to the President of the United States
for his approbation as required by the U.S. Constitution?
Within the
Proclamation of Ratification of July 20, 1868
/
- U.S. Secretary of State, William H. Seward,
expressed reservations as to the legitimacy of the
governments of those southern States that were under the
military government of the United States and what were
his responsibilities in making legal determinations regarding the
ratification votes of those States. The question must be
asked: “Who has the authority to make legal determinations
regarding the ratification of Amendments to the Constitution for the
United States?”
The questions
presented needs to be answered and without answers, the declared
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment must be found
"ultra vires" and void "ab initio."
The federal Courts
of Coleman v. United States, / United
States v. Stahl /
and Epperly et.al. v. United States /
have declared that all issues pertaining to amending of the U.S.
Constitution are “political questions” for Congress
or the States to address. As the Congress of the United States
of America on several occasions over the past 100 years -refused-
to address the questions presented, the Congress has taken
the position that under Article V /
of the Constitution for the United States of America and
Article X /
of the Bill of Rights, the legislatures of the States have
the "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issues." It is THE PEOPLE IN
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OR THE LEGISLATURES OF THE SEVERAL
STATES THAT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE IF AN AMENDMENT HAS BEEN
ADOPTED IN ACCORDANCE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
United States
Constitution
The
Fourteenth
Amendment
[FICTION
OR FACT]
The validity, or
should we say invalidity, of the Civil War Amendments is very
important to reinstating the inalienable rights of free white
Citizens in the United States of America. At every juncture
where the government of the United States of America and/or the
governments of the several States attempt to usurp inalienable
rights, the Civil War Amendments are ultimately claimed to
be the authority for such deprivations of rights.
To determine
whether the Fourteenth Amendment is fiction or fact, we will
proceed to dissect each Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, sentence by sentence. Please remember that the
following Authorities reflects the understanding of the
Founding Fathers at the time the Constitution for the United
States was adopted, and although they may not be "politically"
correct today, the Authorities represents the law at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was (purportedly) adopted.
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT - SECTION ONE
We begin with
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment which reads:
"All
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1, United States Constitution
The first
sentence of Section One provides:
"All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, ..."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section One
Notice there is no
relation to race and there is no definition of person, other than
the "p" in person is not capitalized,
indicating the word would not mean a "Natural Person,"
but a "juristic person" or "artificial
person." As the courts have said, the "due
process" and "equal protection"
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to Corporations
which are juristic (artificial) persons.
Compare this with
Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the
Constitution for the United States of America:
"No
Person except a natural born Citizen, ..."
Notice the "N"
in "no", the "P" in "Person"
and the "C" in "Citizen." All of
the capitalization is on the object to be distinguished as to who is
a Natural Person. This is further clarified in Amy v. Smith:
/
"Free negroes
and mulattoes are, almost everywhere, considered and treated as a
degraded race of people; insomuch so, that, under the constitution
and laws of the United States, they can not become citizens of
the United States."
Amy v. Smith,
1 Litt. Ky. R. 334.
In light of this,
no person would be considered as a United States Citizen or a
citizen of the United States; as the Constitution was framed to
incorporate the common law, in opposition to international
law.
common law - one
race governs;
international law -
all races govern.
The capitalization
of the words "Person" and "Citizen"
could mean only one thing, the denoting of only those of one race in
compliance with the common law.
"The American
colonies brought with them the common, and not the civil law;
and each state at the revolution, adopted either more or less of it,
and not one of them exploded the principle, that place of birth
conferred citizenship."
Amy v. Smith, 1
Litt. Ky. R. 337-38.
Under the
common-law (and under American Constitutions), "Citizenship"
was dependent upon right of inheritance which can only be passed by
lineage (race). This is in accord with the Preamble
(Constitution for the United States of America), which
states that the Constitution was adopted for the protection of "We
The People" and "their posterity,"
- posterity - being a racial term.
The "p"
in "persons" of the Fourteenth Amendment is
not referring to those referred to in Article IV, Section
2, Constitution for the United States of America.
"...
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, ..."
Notice the word:
"subject." Those that were not of the white race
(when the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed) were
natural born "subjects.”
"Blacks,
whether born or in bondage, if born under the jurisdiction and
allegiance of the United States, are natives, and not aliens. They
are what the common law terms natural-born subjects ... The better
opinion, I should think, was, that Negroes or other slaves,
born within and under the allegiance of the United States, are
natural-born subjects, but not citizens. Citizens, under our
constitution and laws, mean free inhabitants, born within the
United States, or naturalized under the law of Congress ..."
Commentaries of
American Law, James Kent,
7th Ed., Vol.
II, at 275-78.
Thus, we find the
meaning and application of the terms: "subject to
the jurisdiction."
A United States
"Citizen" (that is a common-law Citizen in one of
the several States at the adoption of the Constitution for the
United States of America) was considered "within"
the jurisdiction of the United States. "Citizens"
were never subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Instead, the United States was subject to the jurisdiction of
the Citizen, that is, under the common law. [See the tenth
Article in Amendment, Constitution for the United
States of America].
According to the
common law principle (upon which our Constitution was founded),
only the race (family) of people forming the sovereignty to
adopt the Constitution (We the People)
are considered "Citizens." All others born
inside the Country and owing allegiance to "We the People"
are natural born "Subjects." Under principles
of International Law, that is, inter-racial law
(See definition in Webster's Dictionary, [1828]),
these "Subjects" (who, by special privilege,
are licensed to become something or do something normally
illegal under the common-law), are said to be "citizens"
and "persons."
"But in
considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that
there is no law of nations standing between the people of the
United States and their Government, and interfering with their
relation to each other. The powers of the government, and the rights
of the citizens under it, are positive and practical regulations
plainly written down. The people of the United States have
delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to
exercise others."
Dred Scott v.
Sandford, (1856-1857)
19 How. (60 U.S.)
393,
452, 15 L.Ed.
691.
It is clear that
the Fourteenth Amendment could not be referring to the
"Citizens" that are known of the white race, but
must be referring to those artificial "citizens" of
the non-white races
"... are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside
..."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1.
This sentence is
interesting, as it not only declares that these "persons"
(small "p") are "citizens"
(small "c") of the United States, but also of the
State they choose to reside in:
"No white
person born within the limits of the United States, ... or born
without those limits, and subsequently naturalized under their laws,
owes the status of citizenship to the recent Amendments to the
Federal Constitution."
Van Valkenburg
v. Brown, (1872) 43 Cal 43, 47.
"Prior to the
adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens
of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress had the
power 'to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,'
but not the power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any
state. But the states generally provided that such persons
might, on sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof,
and then the courts held, ab convenienti, rather than
otherwise, that they became ipso facto citizens of the
United States."
Sharon v. Hill,
(1885) 26 F 337, 343.
Notice the words:
"some one of them." This refers to citizenship of
"some one" of the States. The national
government had no power to make citizens of its own and force them
upon the States. The States could make anyone they chose to be a
citizen of their State, but only those of the white race
could be recognized as national citizens under the Preamble
to the Constitution for the United States of America and
be treated as "Citizens" in any State they
entered.
Thus, only white
State citizens held the privileges and immunities known
to Article IV, Section 2, among the
several States, and no State could confer that
Constitutional protection on any other race. In consequence
thereof, the "also" could not authorize
a "non-white" to be an "Officer" of
the United States government. These elements were what was
referred to as "national citizenship" (prior
to the Fourteenth Amendment) to avoid one State (or
the States collectively at the national level) from
interfering in another State's sovereignty,
or the sovereignty "We the People".
The Fourteenth
Amendment attempts to reverse this natural common-law order of
things by making State citizenship dependent upon national
citizenship.
"... By the
original constitution, citizenship in the United States was a
consequence of citizenship in a state. By this clause [Am 14,
Sec 1] this order of things is reversed. Citizenship in
the United States is defined; it is made independent of citizenship
in a state, and citizenship in a state is a result of citizenship in
the United States. So that a person born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is, without
reference to state constitutions or laws, entitled to all privileges
and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States to
citizens thereof."
U.S. v. Hall,
(1871) 26 Fed. Case 79, 81.
"Prior to the
adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens
of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress had the
power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,"
but not the power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state.
But the states generally provided that such persons might, on
sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the
courts held, ab convenienti, rather than otherwise, that they
became ipso facto citizens of the United States."
Sharon v. Hill,
(1885) 26 F 337, 343.
Notice the words
"ab convenienti," which means after the event. This
means after the Constitutional Convention. And the words
"ipso facto," which interprets as after the
sovereignty was established, (composed only of members of the
white race [family]).
The choice of words
here is interesting, as they did not use the words: "nunc pro tunc,"
which means to do what should have been done in the beginning.
In other words, they are not saying they made a mistake by not
including other races when the Constitution was framed. They are
only claiming to changed the order of things, regardless of the
correctness of the original circumstance.
This Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment totally dissolves the State's
(people of the State) right to declare its own sovereign
body. It is in violation of "State Sovereignty" and
completely violates Article IV, Sections 2 and 4,
and the Ninth and Tenth Articles in Amendment.
"The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
"A person
charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of
the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
"No Person
held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may
be due."
Constitution for
the United States of America, Article IV, Section 2.
"The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Ninth Article in
Amendment to the
Constitution for
the United States of America.
"The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
Tenth Article in
Amendment to the
Constitution for
the United States of America.
To understand that
not only Article IV, but all other Articles (I
through VII) were written only for the government of and
for the white race (thereby barring those not of the white race
from coming under their protection), you are referred to the case
of Crandall v. Connecticut: /
"The first
Congress after the constitution was adopted, was composed of many of
those distinguished patriots, who framed the constitution, and from
that circumstance would be supposed to know what its spirit was.
Some of the earliest work they performed for the country, was to
establish by law a uniform rule of naturalization. The first
law was by Congress in 1790, and in its precise and technical
language is used: 'Any alien, being a free white person, may
become a citizen, by complying with the requirements hereinafter
named.' In the year 1795, a further regulation was made by
law, when the same language was used: 'Any free white person may
become a citizen,' &c. In 1798-1802-1813, and 1824,
similar laws were passed, on the same subject, and in each of those
laws, the same technical language is used. These laws were carrying
into effect the constitution itself; and if the constitution in any
part of it embraced coloured persons as citizens, then Congress
mistook its duty,
and early departed from its provisions. Congress have also marked
this distinction of colour in the post-office laws 'No person of
colour can be engaged in the post-office, or in the transportation of
mail.' This is a right open to all but persons of colour."
Crandall v.
Connecticut, (1834) 10 Conn 358.
"To my mind,
it would be a perversion of terms, and the well known rule
of construction, to say, that slaves, free blacks, or Indians,
were citizens, within the meaning of that term, as used in the
constitution. God forbid that I should add to the degradation of
this race of men; but I am bound, by my duty, to say, they are not
citizens. I have thus shown you that this law is not contrary to the
2d section of the 4th art. of the constitution
of the United States; for that embraces only citizens."
Ibid, at 347.
Note the word
"citizen" as it used in Crandall. For the
definition of the word "citizen", we refer
you to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., (1859):
"CITIZEN,
persons. 3. All natives are not citizens of the United States;
the descendants of the aborigines, and those of African origin,
are not entitled to the rights of citizens. Anterior to the adoption
of the constitution of the United States, each State had the right to
make citizens of such persons as it pleased. That constitution
does not authorize any but white persons to become citizens of the
United States; and it must therefore be presumed that no one is a
citizen who is not white."
Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, 8th Ed. (1859), Title "Citizen," p. 231.
"CITIZEN,
persons. 2. Citizens are either native born or naturalized.
Native citizens may fill any office; naturalized citizens may
be elected or appointed to any office under the constitution of
the United States, except the office of president and
vice-president. The constitution provides, that 'the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states.' "
Ibid, at p. 231.
This leaves no
doubt who (under the organic law of this Nation) are solely
defined as "Citizens" (Persons), or what race
is the sovereign body. No one else is included.
The Fourteenth Amendment is an attempt to unseat the
organic law and we should question any and all government Officials
who would condone this type of deception.
Notice in
government reprints of the Constitution for the United States
of America, Article I, Section 2,
Clause 3:
"Representatives
and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number
of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other Persons."
Constitution for
the United States of America,
Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3.
Upon checking the
Constitution for the Confederate States of America, the people of the
Confederacy (who knew and understood the organic law of this
Nation) re-worded the Preamble and Article
I, Section 2, Clause 3, as follows:
"We, the
people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign
and independent character, in order to form a permanent
federal government, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity -- invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God –
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate
States of America."
Preamble to
the Constitution for the Confederate States of America.
"Representatives
and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States,
which may be included within this Confederacy, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined, by adding to the whole
number of free persons, including those bound to service for a
term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all
slaves."
Constitution for
the Confederate States of America,
Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3.
Notice "We,
the people" and "to ourselves and our posterity"
were preserved. Also, notice the substitution of the word:
"Persons" for that of the word: "slaves."
"No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; ..."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1.
This sentence of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, makes all
State Constitutions which set their sovereign body as the white
race only (such as Oregon's Constitution) null and
void.
"In all
elections not otherwise provided for by this constitution, every
white male citizen of the United States, ..."
Oregon
Constitution, (1859) Article II, Section 2.
and
others, such as:
"The electors
or members of the general assembly shall be free white male
citizens of the State, ..."
Georgia
Constitution, (1865) Article V, Section 1.
"Every free
white man at the age of twenty-one years being a native or
naturalized citizen of the United States,..."
North Carolina
Constitution, (1856) Article I, Section 3, Clause 2.
"Every white
male citizen of the commonwealth, resident therein, aged twenty-one
years and upwards, being qualified to exercise the right of suffrage
..."
Virginia
Constitution, (1830) Article III, Section 14.
"That every
white male citizen of this State, above twenty-one years of age, and
neither, having resided twelve months within the State, and six
months in the county, ..."
Maryland
Constitution, (1810) Article 14.
"All elections
of governor, senators, and representatives shall be by ballot.
And in such elections every white free man of the age of twenty-one
years, ..."
Delaware
Constitution, (1792) Article IV, Section 1.
See Neal v.
Delaware, /
as to nullification of State Constitutions under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
All of these
provisions of the Constitutions for the States are now "null
and void" if the Fourteenth Amendment is
considered as a valid Amendment to the Constitution for
the United States of America (which it certainly is
not). No State legislature could change the governing class
which put the legislature into being and which class was set in their
own State Constitution.
Here we must also
note the difference between the Fourteenth Amendment's
"privileges and immunities" Clause and the
"privileges and immunities" Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. (See Maxwell
v. Dow, /).
"... nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1.
Notice how close
the wording of this sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is to
the wording of the fifth Article in Amendment:
"... nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
Fifth Article in
Amendment,
Constitution for
the United States of America.
Notice the
Fourteenth Amendment deviates from the fifth Article in
Amendment on the issue of compensation. The Fourteenth
Amendment says, "equal protection," where the
fifth Article in Amendment says, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
The problem (it
appears) in this change of wording is to give martial law
properties to the fifth Article in Amendment,
thereby converting the common-law remedial effect of the fifth
Article in Amendment, to a martial law remedy. This could
be why the courts use the word "purview" when
referencing the Articles in Amendment (Articles One
through Eight) in relation to the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Purview.
Enacting part of a statute, in contradistinction to the preamble.
The part of a statute commencing with the words 'Be it enacted,'
and continuing as far as the repealing clause; and hence, the design,
contemplation, purpose, or scope of the act."
Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1979).
It appears that
when the Judges speak of any common-law remedy, principle, or maxim,
as being within "purview" of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they are converting a common-law remedy, principle, or
maxim, to a martial law remedy, principle, or maxim of law. In
such cases, the common law remedy, principle, or maxim is
eliminated and, of course, the unalienable rights of the Citizen
are also eliminated (in favor of martial law rule).
This conversion of
the common law to properties of martial law nature is obvious.
The Fourteenth Amendment (with military force to
enforce it) allows all races to govern. A maxim which
violates the common-law with the power (force) of martial law.
According to these
principles, we must take another look at this portion of
the Fourteenth Amendment. What is "due
process" under the Fourteenth Amendment?
Amazingly enough, "due process" is completely
defined within the Amendment by the integral words that follow those
very terms, "equal protection of the laws."
Nothing more than
"equal protection of the law" is required to satisfy
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, equal tyranny and deprivation of common-law rights to all
meets the equal protection principle. So, what protection
is given? Answer: As much as the national
government wishes to give, and no more. Congressional protection
can be enlarged and contracted as much as Congress and Administrative
Agencies wish, provided only that these changes affect all equally.
If everyone is chained to a post for their own protection, then
they have "equal protection of the law" under
the law martial.
To see the clear
and inherent weakness of the "Due Process Clause"
of the Fourteenth Amendment, we look below to find
that the common-law principles clearly known to the Bill of
Rights do not apply to the Fourteenth Amendment
and "Due Process."
"The right of
trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment
(Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 US 90), and the right to bear
arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment (Presser v.
Illinois, 116 US 252), have been distinctly held
not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by
the States, and in effect the same decision was made in respect of
the guarantee against prosecution, except by indictment by grand
jury, contained in the Fifth Amendment (Hurtado v.
California, 110 US 516), and in respect of the
right to be confronted with witnesses, contained in the Sixth
Amendment. (West v. Louisiana, 194 US 258).
In Maxwell v. Dow, supra, where the plaintiff in error
had been convicted in a state court of a felony upon information and
by a jury of eight persons, it was held that the indictment,
made indispensable by the Fifth Amendment, and the
trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,
were not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
as those words were used in the Fourteenth Amendment ...
the decision rested upon the ground that this clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the States to abridge
the personal rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments, because
these rights were not within the meaning of the clause 'privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States.' ... We
conclude, therefore, that the exemption from compulsory
self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity
of National citizenship guaranteed by this clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the
States...
"... it is
possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first
eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded
against State action, because a denial of them would be a denial of
due process of law ... If this is so, it is not because those
rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they
are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due
process of law."
Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-99,
29 S.Ct. 14,
53 L.Ed. 97.
Therefore, any
reference to Amendments One through Eight, (when
applied to the State, or through purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment in any way) replaces the common law
thereof with martial law. This is pure theft of our God given
common law birthright. The first Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment's purpose is to:
Convert
common-law Citizens to statutory citizens and statutory persons
under martial law rule; and,
Convert
common-law remedies, principles, and maxims in Articles One
through Ten in Amendment to martial law remedies,
principles, and maxims through the Fourteenth Amendment;
and,
Convert
common-law rights ownership of property to martial law confiscation
of property, in which a private citizen is not capable of protecting
his property under the common-law; and,
Completely
remove the common-law jurisdiction from the original people and
their Posterity and convert them to Statutory Persons who can be
brought within purview of the Fourteenth Amendment under
national, international, martial law rule; and,
Completely
destroy the restrictions on those not of the white race to enter our
Nation and dislodge the people mention in the Preamble as the
governing body of this white Nation; and,
Completely
destroy the ability of the said people to govern by allowing those
not of our race to hold elected Office, both State and National.
All this is done
with the intention of breaking down State sovereignty by an increased
power of the national side of the United States government with a
corresponding loss of power for State sovereignty on the federal
side of the United States. This leaves the existence of the
United States government less dependent (or not dependent at
all) upon the existence of the several States.
The Fourteenth
Amendment set the stage for the destruction of "white
rule" under Christian doctrine in the United States of
America.
Ultimately, they
will not succeed, as God has designated this land for the regathering
of the twelve tribes of Israel to become a mighty Nation again, and
so it will be as God has proclaimed.
/
/ / / / /
/
/ / / / /
/
/ / / / /
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT - SECTION TWO
The next Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
"Sec. 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when
the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice-president of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis for representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 2.
The purpose of the
initial sentence of section Two is clear by its own terms:
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, . . ." The intention
is to give those persons (previously known as "chattels")
a "whole" character and to give that character
representation as a "citizen;" accordingly, allowing
the States to claim those persons for purposes of representation
in the United States government. [Elk v. Wilkins
/].
What does the
original Constitution say on the subject?
"Representatives
and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term
of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of
all other Persons."
Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3,
Constitution for
the United States of America.
Under Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3, we can see that the Framers
understood that they would not allow the direct taxation of property
in the several States (by the United States) by excluding
those persons held in servitude as "property" from
apportionment for direct taxes. The only exception made was that of
counting those persons at three-fifths of their actual enumeration
and adding that to the whole number of free persons.
At the time of
adoption of the Constitution for the United States of America,
the southern States feared that they would be powerless in
the new government due to low population of free persons in those
States. A compromise was struck which allowed additional
representation for the populace held as slaves with a corresponding
increase in taxation for the additional representation. This carried
two benefits with the new government:
More
revenue would be generated by the United States from these States;
and,
These
States would be more likely to ratify the Constitution, having more
equal authority in the central government. But even here,
representation and direct taxes were not considered on the same
level. [See: 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 195 (1906)].
The first sentence
of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment is wholly
in conflict with, and in contradiction to, Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3, as well as the Preamble.
The only reason these persons (Slaves) were even given a
three-fifths character in the United States Census was for the
purpose of taxation (which incidentally, prevented the slave
States from suffering a lack of sufficient representation in the
United States House of Representatives). By no means was
this three-fifths character to imply any direct representation of the
persons to whom it related. [See: 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 107
(1906)].
Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, if any State refuses to give this class
"suffrage" in State elections (by the
terms of Section Two [14th Am.]), a disability is
imposed. When this disability is imposed, the State subjected
to the disability loses the three-fifths representation it had
based upon the number of such "persons" and for that
reason is repugnant to the organic law.
Rather than
returning a State to its original standing or representation
under Article I (by counting non-whites as
three-fifths for purposes of taxation and incidental representation),
the uncooperative State is forced into the very condition the
Framers of the Constitution intended to prevent by the compromise
struck at the Constitutional Convention. And since Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of
taxation, it is presumable that the State would still be taxed
according to at least three-fifths apportionment for the number of
those persons inhabiting the State, an unequal taxation
never intended. [See The Federalist, No. 34].
Moreover, without
the three-fifths disability place upon non-whites, the people
mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution for
the United States of America, (or rather, their
"Posterity") no longer can maintain their
superior character over their own governmental affairs as the
founders and sovereignty of the government. This amounts to no
less than allowance of a foreign invasion into the several States of
the Union, sanctioned by Congressional (State and Federal)
legislation against the people of the States in violation of
their respective sovereignties.
One thing that must
be noted: Although this disability would be imposed upon the States
that were uncooperative, they could still deny "suffrage"
to the "Subjects" of the United States.
In Section Two
of the Fourteenth Amendment, "Indians not taxed"
were still excluded as they are in Article I, Section
2, Clause 3. The reason "Indians not taxed"
(taken) were still excluded is because of their allegiance
to, and membership in, a separate racial sovereignty, that is,
the Indian Nations. [See, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 626].
The court of Elk
v. Wilkins, /
later determined that holding Indians outside the consideration for
representation was wholly inconsistent with destruction of racial
distinction proposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is
speculated that this decision was made because to decide otherwise,
would reveal the racial sovereignty principles of the U.S.
Constitution in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
and the Preamble. The purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to destroy the common-law ideal that each race
(enlarged family) constituted a separate sovereignty in
their own governments. It should be noted that this principle
(destruction of racial recognition) has now been extended
to all races, including artificial juristic persons
(corporations etc.) even though the Fourteenth Amendment
initially was put into existence on the proposition that it was only
intended to benefit the African race.
"The
Fourteenth Amendment is to be liberally construed to carry out
the purpose of its framers, but it is not to be restricted in its
application because designed originally to rectify an existing wrong.
The amendment was adopted soon after the close of the civil war,
and undoubtedly had its origin in a purpose to secure the newly made
citizens in the full enjoyment of their freedom. But it is in no
respect limited in its operation to them. It is universal in
its application, extending its protective force over all men, of
every race and color, within the jurisdiction of the States
throughout the broad domain of the Republic."
8 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 256;
See also,
authorities cited therein.
It is no wonder
that this Amendment has been held to apply to artificial
(juristic) persons since its purpose was to artificially
(by operation or fiction of law) confer citizenship on classes
never recognized as "Citizens" under common-law
principles that are based upon the natural law.
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT - SECTION THREE
Section 3 of
the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
"Sec. 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid
or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by vote of
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 3.
This provision, at
first glance, was obviously intended to punish the active
southern participants in the Civil War. But this Section
(like the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment)
later proved to deprive the rights of Citizens in the (so-called)
northern States as well. For instance, under this Section,
Congress enacted legislation requiring Citizens to take an "Oath
of Allegiance" before being allowed to vote (thus
interfering with their right of suffrage and exercise of sovereignty
and before obtaining judgments in the courts of the United States
[thus interfering with the Citizens right to obtain remedy]).
The "Oath"
spoken of was created during the Civil War and continued thereafter
under the martial law of this Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was created with the intent to circumvent any
exercise of State sovereignty, either by Conventions of the People
of the State or by "Acts" of their legislature
which could interfere with the unauthorized superiority exercised by
the United States government through the force of martial law.
"... it shall
be the duty of the heads of the several departments to cause to be
administered to each and every officer, clerk, or employee, now in
their respective departments, or in any way connected therewith,
or who shall hereafter in any way become connected therewith, to
following oath, viz.: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as
the case may be) that I will support, protect, and defend the
Constitution and Government of the United States against all enemies,
whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith,
allegiance, and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution, or
law of any State Convention or Legislature to the contrary
notwithstanding; and, further, that I do this with a full
determination, pledge, and purpose, without any mental
reservation or evasion whatsoever; and, further, that I will
well and faithfully perform all the duties which may be required of
me by law. So help me God."
"And that each
and every such civil officer and employee, in the departments
aforesaid, or in any way connected therewith, in the service or
employment of the United States, who shall refuse to take the
oath or affirmation herein provided, shall be immediately
dismissed and discharged from such service or employment."
"An Act
requiring an Oath of Allegiance, and to support the Constitution of
the United States, to be administered to certain Persons in the
Civil Service of the United States."
Approved August 6,
1861,
Ch. 64, Section
1, 12 Stat. 326.
Also see the "Oath"
prescribed for West Point Cadets in "An Act providing for
the better Organization of the Military Establishment."
Approved August 3, 1861 /
The "Oath
of Allegiance" was also used in many other relations. To
obtain a "Judgment" in the courts of the United
States (and to raise claims in its departments and bureaus, for
instance), Congress enacted:
". . . the
commanders of all American vessels sailing from ports in
the United States to foreign ports, during the continuance
of the present rebellion, and all persons prosecuting claims
either as attorney or on his own account, before any of
the departments or bureaus of the United States, shall be
require to take the oath of allegiance, and to support the
Constitution of the United States (or affirm, as the case
may be,) as required of persons in the civil service of the
United States, by the provisions of the act of Congress approved
August Sixth, eighteen hundred and sixty one. . . ."
"An Act
requiring the Commanders of American Vessels sailing to foreign ports
and Persons prosecuting Claims, to take the Oath of Allegiance."
Approved
July 17, 1862,
Ch. 205,
Sect. 1,
12 Stat. 610.
". . . .
Provided, however, That in order to authorize the said court to
render a judgment in favor of any claimant, if a citizen of the
United States, it shall be set forth in the petition that the
claimant, and the original and every prior owner thereof where the
claim has been assigned, has at all times borne true allegiance to
the Government of the United States, and whether a citizen or not,
that he has not in any way voluntarily aided, abetted, or given
encouragement to rebellion against the said Government, which
allegations may be traversed by the Government, and if on the trial
such issue shall be decided against the claimant, his petition shall
be dismissed. An Act to amend.
"An Act
to establish for Investigation of Claims against the United States,"
approved February twenty-fourth, eighteen hundred and fifty-five.
Approved March 3,
1863,
Ch. 152,
Sect. 12,
12 Stat. 765,
767.
"... Whenever
it shall be material in any suit or claim before any court to
ascertain whether any person or party asserting the loyalty of any
such person to the United States during such rebellion, shall be
required to prove affirmatively that such person did, during said
rebellion, consistently adhere to the United States and did give no
aid or comfort to persons engaged in said rebellion; and the
voluntary residence of any such person in any place where, at any
time during such residence, the rebel force
or organization held
sway, shall be prima facie evidence that such person did give aid and
comfort to said rebellion and to the persons engaged therein."
"An Act
to provide for Appeals from the Court of Claims, and for
other Purposes."
Approved June 25,
1868,
Ch. 71, Sec. 3,
15 Stat. 75.
Also see: "An
Act making Appropriations for the legislative, executive, and
judicial Expenses of the Government for the Year ending the
thirteenth of June, eighteen hundred and seventy-one."
Approved July 12, 1870 /
All of these "Acts"
of martial law that require an "Oath of Allegiance"
from the people who are already "Citizens" within
the original meaning of the Constitution, are given a continuing
affect through Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under these "Acts" created under Section Three
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Citizens are (or could
be) treated as being "guilty" of insurrection or
rebellion until they prove themselves innocent. This is again a
reversal of the common-law maxim that one is innocent until proven
guilty and contrary to the intent of the fifth Article in
Amendment to the Constitution for the United States
of America.
For those who
may take offense to the use of the terms "Civil War"
(as opposed to "the war between the States"), we
will continue to use those terms for a reason. The cause of
this War was the attempt of the national government to interfere in
the sovereignty of the several States through National Civil Law;
thus, the actual controversy ("political" as well as
"military") is known as the "Civil
War."
This was a War over
the intrusion of Civil Law upon the Common Law. The court of
Diamond v. Harris, /
calls the Civil Law (statutory law) "superior equity":
"It is
difficult to see how the courts of this State are to ignore the
common law as a rule of decision, when it is made so by statute,
and adopt the civil law, even though it have the merit of
superior equity."
Diamond v.
Harris, (1830) 33 Tex 634, 638.
In the meantime,
"Civil Law" was the form of law imposed in the Roman
Empire which was largely (if not wholly) governed by martial
law rule.
"Equity"
has always been understood to follow the law; to have "superior
equity," is to turn things on their head. This is
exactly what happens when martial law is imposed. If "equity"
is the law, then it follows its own course rather than following the
common law, thereby destroying the common law and leaving what
is called "equity" in its place. We can't even
begin to count the number of times Judges, Lawyers, and Statesmen
have said:
"There isn't
any common law anymore. It has been replaced by Statutes."
They would be more
truthful if they said:
"There
isn't any common-law any more, it has been replaced by martial law."
The 1789
Judiciary Act, Section 16 /
prevented the courts of the United States from entertaining a
suit in equity where there was an adequate remedy at law.
"Sec. 16.
And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be
sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case
where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law."
"An Act
to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,"
Approved
September 24, 1789,
Ch. 20, Section
16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
This statute
was taken from a principle well known to the common law and was made
by men who participated in the creation of our Constitution. The
Civil Law that followed the Civil War is found to be this
so-called "Superior Equity" instituted under the
police power created in the Fourteenth and related
Amendments. This so-called "superior equity"
can only be imposed under conditions of "martial law rule"
where the law is in suspension.
If the judiciary
has no right to proceed in equity when the law provides
adequate remedy, how does the Congress propose to statute
the principles of equity, and then claim to have made law?
It would seem that such a practice is wholly unlawful (in light
of legal principles known to the Constitution and to the several
States at the time of its adoption).
As well, it must be
noted that "martial law" is known (for the most
part) to follow the course set by men rather that the course set
by law (its jurisdiction being based on "force"
and coerced consent). Even where concerned, it must be
justified by those imposing it or they eventually will be held liable
for damages caused by its imposition.
"What is
called 'proclaiming martial law' is no law at all; but merely
for the sake of public safety, in circumstances of great emergency,
setting aside all law, and acting under military power; a
proceeding which requires to be followed by an act of indemnity when
the disturbances are at an end."
8 Atty. Gen. Op.
365, 367, February 3, 1857.
The Framers
understood Common-Law to be superior law in all areas where it could
be given effect. In fact, the Constitution for the United States of
America incorporates the Common-Law in many of its provisions by
using Common-Law terms which only the Common-Law can define.
It should not be
forgotten, that the first laws of the United States carry great
weight in construction of the powers given in the Constitution for
the United States of America, (as well as the lawful manner
of instituting those powers /).
"To all this
mass of proof we have still to add, that Congress has repeatedly
legislated upon the same construction of the Constitution that we
have given. Three laws, two of which were passed almost immediately
after the Government went into operation, will be abundantly
sufficient to show this. The two first are particularly
worthy of notice,
because many of the men who assisted in framing the Constitution,
and took an active
part in procuring its adoption, were then in the halls of
legislation, and certainly understood what they meant when they used
the words 'people of the United States' and 'citizen'
in that well considered instrument."
Dred Scott v.
Sandford, (1856 - 1857),
19 How. (60
U.S.) 393, 419, 15 L.Ed. 691.
While the
distinction between "law" and "equity"
are now claimed to be abolished by Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the combining of both
jurisdictions under a singular procedure could only be done outside
the judicial power under martial law rule. Some courts still
seem to recognize some distinctions in law and equity (possibly to
avoid explaining the damage done to the judicial power by this
combination).
Getting back to the
point, from Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment
we can see that the southern States would be disabled from recovering
their sovereignty by propositions of this Section (because
all that were sympathetic to their cause would be [and were]
refused "Office" in the United States
government). This was necessary for the northern Revolutionaries
to maintain the results of their usurpation of the Preamble
to the Constitution and their imposition of "martial
law."
According to McKee
v. Young, /
all that is necessary to constitute: "Aid and comfort"
(as known in Section Three of the Fourteenth
Amendment) is giving the enemy words of encouragement or
expression of favorable opinion while occupying an
influential position. /
From this it is obvious that southern Public Officials
were targeted for punishment for their attempts to maintain the power
of the Preamble to the Constitution for the United
States of America (as well as the principles of the
Federal government known to and required by that instrument).
NOTE:
Secession of the southern States is not condoned, but a recognition
that the south seceded due to the usurpatious Acts
pursued by the national government is intended. The several States
did have the right to withdraw their Senators from the national
government to suspend its operation until such time as it conformed
itself to the requirements of the Constitution. It appears that
secession was used by the northern Revolutionaries as
justification for the acts of a usurpatious national government.
This mistake should never be repeated.
It has been said
that the Thirteenth Amendment (and subsequent Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution) bear the same
authority as other provisions of the Constitution (being Amendments
thereto) rather than bearing the inferior quality of "statutes"
which may be considered "void" when made without
authority of the Constitution as adopted.
Not only are these
Amendments contrary to the original intent of the Framers,
(which recognized only a white sovereignty [We the
people]), but even Congress has treated the Fourteenth
Amendment as a mere statute. It is well known that the
Constitution for the United States of America may not be
amended by statute. [Article V, Constitution for
the United States of America]. It is presumable
that Congress fully understands this fact. "An Act of Congress"
Approved June 6, 1898, /
provides:
". . . that
the disability imposed by Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution heretofore incurred is hereby
removed."
According to
Marbury v. Madison, /
either the Constitution is the supreme and paramount law,
unchangeable by mere legislative enactment, or it is a futile attempt
by the people to control their government. Either the Fourteenth
Amendment has no more standing than a statute or it violates the
principles of government proposed by the original Constitution by
allowing Congress to change its provisions by its own
legislative authority. [See Rogers v. Bellei
/
(Dissenting Opinion), as to Congress changing the intent of
the Fourteenth Amendment by mere legislation]. This being
the case, the Fourteenth Amendment must be something
less than organic law.
Ironically enough,
Madison (the Defendant in Marbury v. Madison
[supra.]) in the Constitutional Convention
(while moving for the ratification of the Constitution by the
people rather than the State legislatures) agreed that a
legislature could not amend the organic law that put it into
existence.
William M. Meigs
of the Philadelphia Bar, in "The Growth of the
Constitution," [See: Vol. 8, Fed. Stat. Anno.
reports Madison's views]:
"Madison
thought the legislatures clearly incompetent (to ratify the United
States Constitution) for the very changes proposed would make
essential inroads on the State Constitution, and a legislature cannot
change the Constitution under which it exists."
8 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 243.
On this (and
other basis), the Constitution for the United States of America
was ratified by "Conventions of the People" of the
States rather than the State legislatures. This raises another
important question: "Were (or are) the State
legislatures competent to ratify Amendments to the Constitution (such
as the Fourteenth Amendment) which effectually changed the
State Constitution by the inroads made into it?"
Obviously the
Constitutional Convention thought that the State
legislatures are incompetent to ratify any organic law that adversely
affected (changed) their State Constitutions. Therefore,
this would appear to give further validity to the proposition that
the State legislatures may only amend the Constitution for
the United States of America according to Article V,
thereof, when the purpose of the Amendment is to hold the United
States government to the limits of its original powers.
Ratification of any Amendment (which expands power of the
United States government beyond its original limits) must
therefore (by any theory) be ratified by "Conventions
of the People" of the class mentioned in the Preamble
in their respective States.
NOTE: The
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
were not ratified by Conventions of the people and thus those
Amendments undermined the States' Constitutions by depriving
both the governments of the several States and the sovereign
people of a great deal of their powers (by purporting to transfer
power to the national government).
It must also be
noted:
"There is no
sounder rule of interpretation (of the Constitution) than that
which requires us (the court) to look at the whole of an
instrument, before we (the court) determine a question of
construction of any particular part..."
U.S. v. Morris,
(1851) 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,815;
See also Madison in
The Federalist, No. 41
and 8 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 253.
Could this be why
there are great efforts being put forth to call a
"Constitutional Convention" for the purpose of
giving final validity to these usurpatious "Acts"
of American legislators?
Regardless of this
fact, it is obvious that the northern usurpation of the
Constitution for the United States of America favoring
international [interracial] law was to be protected from
southern resistance by martial law. By Section Three of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Congress would be
allowed to decide when the principles of the Preamble were
dead and when those who maintained those principles were also dead
(or when they were no longer a threat to these
usurpatious "Acts" against our Constitution).
Considering the
weight of the evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment is
of martial law jurisdiction, we can begin to understand why it
was thought that Congress might repeal the disabilities of Section
Three without a Constitutional Amendment (outside of the
scope of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18,
Constitution for the United States of America).
Over the years, the
people have had a great deal of trouble accessing the judicial power
of the courts. Since martial law suspends the judicial power
(along with other regular powers of government), this is
quite understandable. Congress' power is (practically speaking)
"unlimited" where the regulation of courts subjected
to martial law rule are concerned. Therefore, why would
Congress think that their power over the martial law measures (in
general), is limited to the Constitution (especially
since Congress claimed power under martial law with the power Clauses
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments)? /
A known maxim to
the Common Law is that it supersedes the military power. The framers
of our national Constitution understood this principle when they
limited Congressional power to make military appropriations to a
maximum term of two years. /
Many Constitutions of the several States also make this
clear by requiring the military power to "bear arms"
to remain subordinate to the civil power.
For example:
"The people
shall have the right to bear arms for the defense (sic) of
themselves, and the State, but the Military power shall be kept in
strict subordination of the civil power."
Oregon
Constitution, (1859) Article I, Section 27.
The second
Article in Amendment also makes the subordination of the
military power to the will of the people clear.
Some say we did not
adopt the whole of the common law of England. This is true to a
certain extent. We did not adopt the monarchy and the feudal
law of England. We did adopt so much of the common law as was
intended by the Framers of the Constitution and those who
ratified it. By the ninth Article in Amendment,
it is clear that all rights known to Englishmen were adopted and were
to be retained by the people. In addition, "the people"
also assumed unto themselves the powers of sovereignty (and the
rights related thereto) as clearly indicated by the tenth
Article in Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
This is the American common-law.
In the Declaration
of Rights and Resolves [1774] (as well as the
Declaration of Independence [1776]), some
of the men who framed the Constitution complained of the force uses
by the King of England that resulted in the loss of trial by jury
and violation of other many rights now known to be protected by
the Bill of Rights. At that time of
American history, the King of England was already using military
force (martial law) to govern the Colonies to deprive
Americans of their rights.
Therefore, it
cannot be presumed that Congress never had the power to use
martial law of any form to govern within the several
States.
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT - SECTION FOUR
Next is Section 4
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"The
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 4, United States Constitution.
As previously in
this exposé, we will continue to dissect the
Fourteenth Amendment with a view to its legal effects,
sentence by sentence, continuing with the remaining portion of
Section Four and going on through Section Five.
The first
sentence of Section Four provides:
"The
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section Four.
For years, several
individuals have been questioning the issue and the use of
paper money by the national government. Of course, we know that
the main medium which plagues us is the Federal Reserve Note,
but in our zeal to uphold the original intent and purpose of
our Constitution, these individuals have made a fatal error -
they have ignored this provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The arguments that
have been used against these "Bills of Credit"
have always focused on Article I, Section 8,
Constitution for the United States of America. For instance,
we know that Congress is empowered to Coin money, not print it.
"The
Congress shall have Power . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures;"
Article I,
Section 8, Clause 5, Const. for the U.S. of A.
Under this Clause,
the Congress fixed the unit of measure for money coined by
the United States at 416 grains of standard Silver (Legal
Tender Cases /),
calling the unit of measure a "dollar." This made
the dollar's Silver a standard by which all other money
("foreign" as well as "domestic")
would be measured. As a result, there is no such thing as a
gold standard in the United States. Congress has the power
to change the weight of a gold dollar without affecting the standard
in Silver. In fact, the Congress is duty bound to change the
gold coin when it no longer reflects a true comparative value to
the standard (a dollar's Silver).
Consequently,
legislation can be found (prior to the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment) changing the amount of
gold contained in a gold dollar. Don't forget that the term:
"dollar" reflects a unit of Silver. When the term:
"dollar" is used with respect to gold, it becomes a
comparative term between the value of Gold and Silver (with
Silver being the constant and Gold [in a sense] being given a
respective value according to true economic conditions).
The only way that
one could avoid being compelled to accept a gold dollar of lessor
weight for the completion of contracts was to make specific reference
to the weight of Gold to be transferred for payment, thus treating
the Gold as a "commodity" rather than a monetary
unit for purposes of the specific Contract. [Legal Tender Cases,
/].
Although Congress
had this power (concerning gold currency), Congress cannot be
deemed to have power to pass legislation which intended to reflect
other than the parity between the standard of measure (dollars
silver) and the gold dollar. To do so, would be to deprive those
contracting in gold dollars of property without due process of
law in that they could not recover the true intrinsic value of
their Contracts. This would violate the fourth Article in
Amendment by seizing property without warrant or
probable cause upon Oath or Affirmation, and would
violate the fifth Article in Amendment by either
taking private property for public use without just compensation or
by depriving property without due process of law.
The question is:
"Can the Congress issue paper and declare it to have an
unrelated value in gold or silver, or can it issue the same without
redemption and force these "Bills of Credit"
to circulate among private Citizens by operation of law?"
There is sufficient authority in the original Constitution
to show that Congress was never intended to exercise such a power, or
at least, not to exercise its power in such a way.
In the
Constitutional Convention, Sherman (in
relation to Article I, Section 10, [Const. for
the U.S. of A.]) said that: "He thought
this was a favorable moment for crushing paper money."
/
This was an extension of the Convention's "determination
to prevent the evils of paper money, already manifested by
striking out from the powers of Congress the power to 'emit bills on
the credit of the United States'." /
It should be noted
that only the States were directly prohibited from interfering in
the Obligation of Contracts. During the House and Senate
debates on H.J.R. 192 of June 5, 1933,
this prohibition was brought into view and it was answered that
the prohibition did not apply to the federal government. While this
may be true, the fourth and fifth Articles in Amendment
of the Bill of Rights accomplish the same thing
by prohibiting the seizure of property without warrant or the
deprivation of property without due process of law. A man has
property in his Contracts and if the "Obligations of Contract"
are interfered with, then that property is deprived of the parties to
the Contract. If this deprivation takes place without proper
judicial proceedings conducted within the limitations of the Bill
of Rights, the taking of property is without authority of
law.
When the question
of "Bills of Credit" (in relation to the powers
of Congress) was raised in the Convention, the power
was offered with the Clause: "to borrow money on the credit
of the United States." Governor Morris
moved to strike out the words "and emit bills on the credit
of the United States." Madison thought it would
be enough to prohibit them from being made a tender. Ellsworth
thought this a favorable moment to bar the door against paper money.
Read that the words (if not struck out) would be "as alarming
as the mark of the beast in Revelation." On this basis,
the words were struck out by nine States to two. /
It is obvious from
the Convention (as well as the powers granted to Congress
concerning coinage of money and borrowing of money on the credit of
the United States) that no direct or implied power was given to
Congress to force circulation of its evidences of debt as a currency.
While Congress has the power to borrow money on the credit of
the United States, the Congress has no power to force any one to
lend to the government (much less the power to spend "debt"
into circulation) without the intention of
repayment whatsoever (as in the case of Federal Reserve Notes
["Promises to pay" are not "payment"]).
As a result of the
money (credit) question (raised by the Fourth Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment), we find it
necessary to review the Legal Tender Cases. For the
most part, those cases were decided during and after the Civil
War Reconstruction period when martial law was in full
bloom in the United States. By looking at these cases in
this new light, much can be gained in the way of
understanding the money issue (as well as the Constitution
in general).
From the Legal
Tender Cases, we first see that the supreme court of the
United States initially declared the legal tender statutes of
February 25th, 1862, July 11th, 1862, and March 3rd, 1863,
to be upheld as: "War measures, exceptional in
their character, not authorized by any express grant of the
power to Congress contained in the Constitution, but as not
prohibited by its terms, and as justified in view of the great public
exigencies which required their adoption." /
In other words, paper money was declared legitimate as "martial
law money" (an emergency war measure).
The supreme court
in Thorington v. Smith, /
(in an Opinion dealing with Judgments of the Confederate courts
[relating to property in dispute in that case]) made a
statement that is applicable to this early decision favoring legal
tender laws made during the hostilities of the Civil War. The court
said in Thorington:
"But
such a judgment, in such a time, has little authority."
Although this was
said in relation to Confederate Judgments, the principle
still applies. In times of war (during imposition of martial
law), the will to win and martial law may override all true
logic (even down to the principles of the organic law).
It appears that the
supreme court held to this principle in the case of
Hepburn v. Griswald, /
In Hepburn (supra.), the supreme court reasoned that
the exigency which allowed the legal tender character to be accorded
to the Civil War "Greenbacks" was over, thus the
conditions which implied the power (to make them legal tender)
had ended. Thus the law could no longer be held "constitutional"
as in the past.
The dissenting
Opinion of the Chief Justice in a later legal tender case reports the
holding of the Hepburn court:
"The majority
of the court as then constituted, five judges to eight, felt obliged
to conclude that an act making mere promises to pay dollars a legal
tender in payments of debts previously contracted is not a means
appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect
any express power vested in Congress, is inconsistent with the spirit
of the Constitution, and is prohibited by the Constitution."
Legal Tender
Case, (1870) 12 Wall. 571, (supra.)
The Opinion of
Hepburn was ordered to be published on January 29th, 1870,
and was decided in Conference on November 27th, 1870.
"The action of
Congress in passage of the first Legal Tender Act was . . . placed
distinctly upon the ground of the existing imperative need of
government, and the legal tender clause was urged and adopted as
a war measure." [martial law].
Julliard v.
Greenman, (1884) 110 U.S. 421;
425, 4 S.Ct. 122;
28 L.Ed. 204.
As many of us know,
this is not the first time that the government has claimed certain
implied powers as an expedient of war or some other emergency.
Martial law measures have consistently been imposed
under the guise of "emergencies" of all kinds
(Roosevelt being the greatest offender since Lincoln).
The Hepburn court (without directly overruling its
previous judgment upholding the Legal Tender Acts) merely
declared that the exigency no longer existed and that continued
enforcement of the statute must be declared unconstitutional.
After the Hepburn
ruling, the United States Attorney General in the cases of
Knox v. Lee, and Parker v. Davis, /
moved to be heard on the Hepburn question
(Julliard v. Greenman, [supra.] /).
These cases were heard almost a year after the Hepburn
case, with the court reconstituted. Congress had passed an
"Act" allowing for an additional Justice and one of
the Justices concurring in the Hepburn case had retired.
These are the conditions under which the question was reheard.
Although the
Concurring Justices in the Hepburn case had not changed
their Opinion, the legal tender Clauses were upheld
(five Justices to four) thus overturning
Hepburn v. Griswald directly. Many have said
this was a packed court, and this may be true. But the court
wasn't packed merely to overturn Hepburn, rather, it was
packed to assure that the recent (and most controversial)
Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld in its entirety.
The legal tender question (as we will see) was merely an
incident of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the words
of Section Four.
In 1870 (December),
the reconstituted court (for the most part) claimed to base
its ruling overturning Hepburn on the grounds laid out in the
Dissenting Opinion of the Hepburn case. The only
real difference in the Opinions of the Hepburn court and this
later legal tender case (Knox and Parker /)
was that the Dissenting Opinion of Hepburn became
the Concurring Opinion of Knox and Parker, and the
Concurring Opinion of Hepburn became the
Dissenting Opinion of Knox and Parker.
It was noted by
the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Field (12 Wall.
634), that the court failed to give any reason for
overturning Hepburn. The question arises, with the turmoil
and flat disloyalty and usurpations involved in adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment still remaining vivid in 1870: "Did
the court dare go to the 4th Section of
the Fourteenth Amendment for the additional law it
needed to justify such an upset in the supreme court?"
(Note: the Fourteenth Amendment was never touted as
an Amendment that would allow Congress a legal tender
power to force paper money on American Citizens).
Justice Field begins his dissent:
"Nothing has
been heard from counsel in these cases, and nothing from the present
majority of the court, which has created a doubt in the mind of the
correctness of the judgment rendered in the case of
Hepburn v. Griswold, or of the conclusions expressed
in the opinion of the majority of the court as then constituted.
That judgment was reached only after repeated arguments were
heard from able and eminent counsel, and after every point raised on
either side had been the subject of extended deliberation."
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 634.
Obviously, no one
had the courage to directly raise the Fourteenth Amendment in
defense of the legal tender statutes. And in fact, you will not find
any direct reference to it in the Arguments of Counsel or the
Majority Opinion of Knox and Parker, (supra.).
Had the case turned on this point, there may have been another
Civil War spilling more blood than the last.
While we do not
wish to go into great detail about the "Concurring"
and "Dissenting Opinions" in these
cases, the court did say some things that we will find important to
this discussion.
A study of the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly reveals the
injustice done by the Amendment (as well as the
injustice done to obtain assent of the States to adopt it).
The court in Knox
and Parker admits that Congress, (by its legal tender laws,
if declared unconstitutional) has done a disastrous
thing:
"Indeed, legal
tender treasury notes have become the universal measure of values.
If now, by our decision, it be established that these debts and
obligations can be discharged only by gold coin; it, contrary to the
expectations of the parties to these contracts, legal tender
notes are rendered unavailable, the government has become an
instrument of the grossest injustice."
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 530.
By the legal tender
law, itself, the government had become the instrument of gross
injustice to the rights of parties who had contracted for specie
payments, now the court is worried that the injustice really done
will be revealed. Congress also was worried about this, and
that is why we have a provision in the Fourteenth Amendment
disallowing any question of the "validity of the public
debt," that is, the validity of Congress' action. If no
one can question this action, then how can the injustice be revealed?
It is further
said by the court:
"It is
incumbent upon those who affirm the unconstitutionality of an act of
Congress to show clearly that it is in violation of the provisions of
the Constitution."
Legal Tender
Cases 12 Wall. 531.
It must be noted
that the litigants against paper money never addressed the validity
of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
No one contested the constitutionality of the Fourth
Section, and while the court alluded to its principles,
direct reference to it is avoided like the plague.
Throughout all the
legal tender cases, the Justices in opposition to legal tender
present a most compelling legal argument (as well as historical
facts and motives of the framers and the people of the States as
references to show that Congress had no power to enact a legal
tender law making paper acceptable as money [as ruled
in Hepburn v. Griswald]).
If looking only at
the original organic law (as the Hepburn court did),
these arguments are absolutely valid. But we must remember that
we are not dealing only with the original organic law (and neither
was the supreme court after the unconstitutional adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment). The Fourteenth
Amendment is claimed to be a part of the organic law, no matter
how false or erroneous that assumption may be. Also, in reviewing
these legal tender decisions, don't forget that the supreme
court is always "on notice" of the Constitution in
its entirety, whether they mention any of its specific provisions or
not in their Opinions.
If four supreme
court Justices won't be heeded when relating the true history and
meaning of our original Constitution, where can we expect to prove
our point merely on the same grounds they raised, without dissuading
the effect of subsequent (so-called) Amendments.
This is exactly what we have done, but not as well as Justice Field
and his fellow dissenting Justices. It seems like a very
futile attempt. All that could be said in the supreme
court (about the original Constitution) in relation to
paper money has been said by its own Justices, with one
exception; the relationship that the Fourteenth Amendment
bears to the subject and the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment
is a mere fiction, not a part of the Constitution. This
question has not been raised. We must answer the question posed
by Justice Field: What allowed Hepburn to
be overturned?
Let us look at some
of the things said by the litigants and the court in upholding the
legal tender law. If we are right about the implications
of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
then some reference must have been made to it, even if
only indirectly.
You might say that
the validity of the public debt has nothing to do with
paper currency, or currency in general. The Attorney
General of the United States (in arguing for
paper money) disagrees:
"There is a
kinship between the borrowing of money and the issuing of a currency
made valuable by being invested with all the facilities of money, in
evidence of that borrowing."
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 526.
Interestingly
enough, no reference is made to the Fourteenth Amendment
by the Attorney General when this statement was made (while
the language relates directly to provisions of the Fourth
Section).
"A decent
respect for a co-ordinate branch of government demands that the
judiciary should presume, until the contrary is clearly show,
that there has been no transgression of power of Congress . . ."
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall 531.
Remember, new power
was conferred upon Congress, more plenary in its character than ever
before, with exception of the Thirteenth Amendment (as
you will see in our discussion of the Fifth Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment, [infra.]).
In speaking
of the powers of Congress:
"It is
allowable to group together any number of them and infer from them
all that the power claimed has been conferred."
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 534.
What about the new
power of the Fourteenth Amendment? The court admits that
the Bill of Rights was intended to
curtail those questionable powers of Congress that may be implied,
"these Amendments are denials of power"
(Legal Tender Cases /);
and refers to the Preamble of the Bill of Rights as
setting that standard. This will be further discussed with
reference to who is competent to amend the Constitution and under
what conditions. But right after the court says this (for the
most part) the Bill of Rights is disregarded. Why does
the Fourteenth Amendment supersede the Bill of Rights
where the power exercised is a direct power conferred after their
adoption? Answer: "The limitations of the Bill
of Rights are common-law principles, while
the Fourteenth Amendment is martial law."
When "martial law" is put into effect, it is used
to suspend the common law, rightfully or otherwise, and therefore
supersedes it.
From the
standpoint of constitutional construction:
"If there be
any conflict between an Amendment and a provision of the
original Constitution, the provision found in the Amendment
must control, under the rule that the last expression of
the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one"
9 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 255.
This also raises
the question: "Who is the lawmaker if there is to be a change
in the members of the sovereign body?" Is it not the
sovereign body itself, rather than their creations (State
legislatures or Congress)?
It is said that the
Congress has power to borrow on the credit of the United States,
and the power to emit "bills of credit" is incident
to that power. But the court relates that when the legal tender laws
were passed, it was the fact that the credit of the United States
had run out which caused the exigency (emergency) requiring a
legal tender law.
"Meanwhile the
public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit of the government,
if not stretched to its utmost tension, had become nearly exhausted
. . ."
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 541 (Concurring Opinion)
If the credit is
exhausted, where is their power to borrow on the credit or any
implied power under it? But, this is not true if the validity of the
debt cannot be questioned (Fourteenth Amendment,
Section Four).
The basic reasoning
of the concurring court in Knox and Parker /
was that Congress has the power to declare war and repel insurrection
(powers of martial law); from this power is the implied power
to make war or the power to execute such war (implied powers of
martial law); coupled with the war powers (martial law
powers) is the power to borrow money on the credit of the
United States; when the credit of the United States runs
out or is short, an emergency exists (an excuse for imposition of
martial law measures) and, under the war powers, loans may
be forced. Under this implied power to enforce loans, the government
may issue "bills of credit" evidencing the
debt and force their acceptance by declaring them "legal tender."
Here we see an implication of power not directly given (in its
fourth generation of implication) all justified under the
power of "martial law." This is stretching things
to say the least, and we have already discussed the borrowing power
being extinguished when the credit of the United States becomes
none existent. The consequence of a marriage between the
war powers and emergency borrowing when there is no credit to
borrow against is legal tender paper money, which would be
better called "martial law money."
Basically, the
power exercised in legal tender was a military power
(martial law power) and when we go back to the
Hepburn case, we see that to be true according to the supreme
court. Now with the war over, wherein could the implied martial
law powers rest? They had no basis, this was the decision of
Hepburn.
It becomes obvious
that Congress needed a new direct grant of power to enforce the
legal tender laws. Thus the Fourth Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment was purposed to maintain the validity of
the public debt, leaving the Bills of Credit issued as
evidence of that debt valid (under an implied power derived from a
new source). Therefore, the Fourth Section of
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to imply the
power to make them (Greenbacks) a legal tender to
maintain the validity of the debt from another source. Nonetheless,
the martial law nature and origin of the debt and its currency
(legal tender) cannot be doubted. It is clearly
stated in the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
By the Fourth
Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress claims a new
direct power as a basis for implied powers that could not
lawfully be used except by necessity of military exigency.
The Fourteenth Amendment is an extension of the
Congress' military (martial law) power over the
entire United States, not confined by any of the Clauses of
the original Constitution for the United States of America
(if the Fourteenth Amendment is fact instead of
fiction).
Look at what is
alleged to have started the Civil War. Allegedly, a shot was fired
on Fort Sumter. Congress has full power under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 to govern Forts,
and it could truly be said that an insurrection had been done against
not one of the United States, but against the property under
control of the Congress of the United States. Congress
(claiming its martial law "power to declare war,"
"suppress insurrections" and "repel
invasions") imposed martial law on the United States
and never discontinued it. The result was an extension of military
and municipal jurisdiction of Congress. But where
is the evidence of this? Look at the Thirteenth Amendment,
the Civil Rights Acts, the Legal Tender Laws,
the Fourteenth Amendment, etc., etc., etc..
The fact that
Congress did not merely extend its coinage power over currency is
clearly admitted by the court:
". . . nor do
we assert that Congress may make anything which has no value money."
Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 553. (Concurring Opinion)
Paper "money"
isn't issued under the money powers of Congress, but under the
military power (in conjunction with the borrowing power)
and this power is not the original power under the
original Constitution, but a new and different power of
martial law rule under the Fourth Section of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The original
borrowing power is only solvent when the credit of the United States
is intact. Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
confers authority beyond that known to the borrowing power of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 which is obvious
since it also relates to the validity of the public debt and
consequently borrowing to create that debt.
In reference to the
federal and national characters of the U.S. Government,
Justice Bradley says "it is a national power that
prevents the States from seceding from the Union."
(Ibid. at 555). When this power is exercised in
prevention of insurrection (as in the Civil War), it is a
national power, and any powers implied by its exigencies are also
national powers. In this case, we are clearly talking about the
national power of martial law.
The Fourteenth
Amendment is an extension of national military powers presently
used in a municipal character and enforced by municipal laws,
stretched far beyond their original limitations and enforced in
Article I Tribunals. See the discussion of Section Five
of the Fourteenth, (infra.) concerning Article I
Tribunals.
The court even had
the nerve to go to the taxing power of Congress to draw certain
implications about Congress' power. We know the lawful bounds of the
taxing power originally conferred are "uniformity"
and "apportionment." Ben Franklin referred
to paper money as imposing "a kind of imperceptible
tax". (See "Concurring Opinion"
of Justice Bradley, Legal Tender Cases
/).
Without the Fourteenth Amendment, how would such
taxation be lawful? Don't forget the Fourteenth Amendment
is considered the last word on the subjects with which it deals.
In 1884, the case
of Julliard v. Greenman /
again raised the legal tender issue. Up to this point, no one
mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment in legal tender
litigation (at least as far as we have found).
Twenty-six years after the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Plaintiff in Error in Julliard v. Greenman
finally makes reference to it:
"The forced
loans of 1862 and 1863, in the form of legal tender notes, were vital
forces in the struggle for national supremacy. They formed a
part of the public debt of the United States, the validity of
which is solemnly established by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution."
Julliard v.
Greenman, 110 US 432.
The
Fourteenth Amendment was further alluded to by the Plaintiff
in Error:
"The question
of the constitutionality of an act of Congress, as well as the
question of its construction, must be considered in the light of the
history of the time when it was enacted."
Julliard v.
Greenman, 110 US 430.
Is
this also not true of an Amendment to the Constitution?
"And whenever
the power sought to be exercised depends, or must be predicated, upon
a given state of facts, the existence of the power is a judicial
question to be determined upon the facts."
Ibid.
And, after alluding
to cases which support this principle in development of the
martial law jurisdiction (wherein the law of the Fourteenth
Amendment lies); he goes on to say:
"The same
doctrine is maintained in the Slaughter-House Cases. /
"
Ibid.
The Slaughter-House
cases are adjudications of civil rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and are consistent with the other
cases cited by the Plaintiff in Error.
Then at the
end of the page 430, the truth really comes out:
"The exercise
of jurisdiction by a court or a legislature assumes the existence of
the jurisdiction in the tribunal or body exercising it."
Ibid.
What is really
being said here? The Fourteenth Amendment has been here,
and the Congress has been allowed to exercise jurisdiction under
it for some 26 years, therefore, it must be assumed to
exist. Even the court upheld this jurisdiction in
the Slaughter-House cases, there is no
inconsistency here.
It appears that the
Plaintiff in Error in Julliard understood exactly what
he was talking about, especially when he says the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the public debt unquestionable in the
same argument.
Of course, the
Julliard court again gives the same arguments in favor of
legal tender notes, (as had been given in the
past). Again, this argument seems to be lacking in something to
give it validity. A close look at the Opinion again
reveals the court alluding to the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment to uphold its position and Justice Field
"Dissents" with the same argument as he, and his
like minded Associates had used in the past, still failing to
convince the majority of the court.
These, the
arguments of Justice Field (and many more arguments)
have been offered against paper money. Consistently, these arguments
have met with little success even when they are valid arguments under
the original Constitution of the United States.
The problem is that
Congress has claimed a new power through the Fourteenth Amendment.
We have been missing the point all along. Our attention has been
focused upon the original Constitution and away from those Amendments
that are designed to destroy our original concept of government.
By Amendment, it is said: "The validity
of the public debt . . . shall not be questioned". If
no one is allowed to question the public debt, then how can anyone
question the "Notes" representing that debt or
the enactments of the legislature forcing us to accept it. We can
not even question Congress' adoption of the immoral principle of
"I'd rather owe you than cheat you out of it".
From this we see
that the only reason for this Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to (ex post facto) give validity to "Martial
Law Acts" (not authorized by the Constitution)
and to prevent the people from contesting those unauthorized "Acts"
of martial law.
Why have we not
been able to prevent the increase of the national debt?
Because, we have no right to question the validity of the
debt in court as long as the Fourteenth Amendment is
considered to be a valid Amendment to the Constitution,
(which it isn't). First, we must attack
the Fourteenth Amendment as "unconstitutional"
before any of the otherwise valid arguments against paper money
will have any effect. We have not been making the wrong
arguments, we just haven't directed them against the perversions
of our organic law.
Why do we have the
Federal Reserve Corporation? If the Congress is
claiming a power to create an unquestionable public debt, then they
will also claim the right to exercise that power through any agent
they wish, especially when that agent simplifies the process of
imposing the debt and increasing it. Congress may claim this power
under guise of the "necessary and proper" Clause
of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, but all
of us will know that the power actually lies under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Section Five, "the power to enforce
this Amendment by appropriate legislation."
The Civil War
Congress not only wanted to protect the "Greenbacks"
in circulation after the Civil War, but it wanted to make provision
for a new and increasing debt. Notice the words: "including
debts incurred . . . in suppressing insurrection
and rebellion . . .".
Had Congress only intended to protect the "Greenbacks"
of the Civil War, these would have been the only
debts protected. Instead, the Congress also included the
public debt (in general) allowing the inclusion of any
debt enacted by Congress. If you wish to study the
Legal Tender Cases further, here are some
authorities:
Houston
v. Moore, (1820) 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 49; 5 L.Ed. 19.
Briscoe
v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, (1837)
36 U.S (11 Pet.) 257, 9 L.Ed. 709.
Lick
v. Faulkner, (1864) 25 Cal. 405.
Thorington
v. Smith, (1868) 8 Wall.1 (supra.).
Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, (1869) 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533; 19 L.Ed. 482.
Legal
Tender Cases, (1870)12 Wall. 457, (supra.).
Legal
Tender Case, (1884) 110 U.S. 421, (supra.).
It is clear from
these cases that the Fourteenth Amendment is a continuation of
military power (martial law) exercised by Congress during
the Civil War and that paper money (legal tender) is
martial law money.
As previously
stated in this exposé, we will continue to dissect the
Fourteenth Amendment, with a view to its legal effects,
sentence by sentence, continuing with the remaining portion
of Section Four and going on through Section
Five.
Let us go to the
next portion of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment and see what relation it has to the first portion and
the money issues we have faced.
"But
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States . . ."
One of the obvious
intentions of these words, was to prevent the southern States from
paying (and their creditors from collecting) debts incurred
through participation in the Civil War. Thus, all those persons who
had become the creditors to the southern States were deprived of
property without due process of law. Such a deprivation of property
by "Legislative Act" constitutes
a "Bill of Attainder" and in its
lesser form, a "Bill of Pains and Penalties."
Congress, as well as the States, are prohibited from
passing such "Acts" in Article I, Sections
9 and 10 of the United States Constitution.
Further more, the "Act" is an "ex post
facto law" punishing the act committed with a law enacted
after commission of the act.
This being true,
how could power be claimed by Congress to amend the Constitution
in this manner? And how could the State legislatures claim
the power to ratify such an Amendment?
This portion of the
Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment also acts
as an "Indemnification Act" for the United
States by making it impossible for any one to lay claims for the
destruction committed by the armies of the United States while
enforcing martial law upon the southern States.
The final portion
of the Fourth Section casts light on the money issue
previously discussed as well as the issues of the aforementioned
paragraph.
"But
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay . . . any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void."
The enactment of
Congress forcing the emancipation of the slaves, was a great loss of
property to those who held them in subjection. The first
emancipation of slaves was ordered by Proclamation of Abraham
Lincoln, President, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the military
forces of the United States (and was later claimed to be
made perpetual by the Thirteenth Amendment). By operation
of these enactments, property was taken and no compensation was
offered and military force was used to enforce this deprivation
of property. "Emancipation" was born out
of martial law and survives under the power of
martial law today.
The fourth
Article in Amendment makes such an unreasonable seizure of
property (seizure of property without warrant issued upon "Oath"
or "Affirmation") unconstitutional and prohibits
Congress from legislating to this end. Similarly, the Constitutions
of the States disable the State legislatures in the same
respect. Neither the Congress nor the State legislatures had
power to pass such legislation, whether in the form of
an Amendment or a Statute.
In addition, the
fifth Article in Amendment prohibits the taking of
property for public use without compensation and further prohibits
the taking of property without due process of law. "Due process
of law" requires a trial by jury in civil cases at
common-law (seventh Article in Amendment)
and an indictment and speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been
committed, and etc., with the right to subpoena witnesses and
face your accusers in criminal cases (sixth Article
in Amendment). Clearly, the members of Congress
knew that they could not prevent claims "for the loss or
emancipation of any slaves" from being successful
in southern Courts. Also, the members of Congress clearly
knew that southern Juries would uphold claims against the United
States as well as the Confederate States for debts incurred and
damages done by the Civil War. Instead of facing this fact, the
members of Congress chose to usurp the law that would be
enforced by Juries, that is, the Common-Law.
Moreover, the
States are prohibited from passing any law violating the
"Obligation of Contracts" (Article
I, Section 10, Constitution for the United States
of America). Every man who holds property lawfully
acquired usually has a "Bill of Sale" evidencing the
transfer of ownership rights. The "Bill of Sale" is
an executed Contract, and as such, is one of the few Contracts
that has real standing at law.
The courts of
equity may "void" a Contract for "fraud"
and other similar conditions; but no one has any power or
right to interfere with valid Contracts and the property rights
acquired under them. If the State can pass no such law, and the
Constitution and its Amendments are law; from whence did the
power come for the State legislatures to ratify such an
Amendment? Martial Law is the only answer.
As a result of this
Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, litigation arose
concerning confederate currency. The adjudication of these cases is
of importance to our understanding of the issues concerning paper
money. The confederate currency bears similarities to
the Federal Reserve Note of today that
cannot be ignored.
Many have said that
the use of Federal Reserve Notes gives rise to
jurisdiction over the transaction for which they were used. The
confederate currency (being designed by the southern States
for all transactions therein [although never made a
legal tender]) was considered to be: " . . . a
currency imposed upon the community by irresistible force."
[Branch v. Haas /].
In Thorington v. Smith /
the supreme court said:
"They have no
necessary relations to the hostile government, whether invading or
insurgent. They are transactions in the ordinary course of civil
society, and though they may indirectly and remotely promote the ends
of the unlawful government, are without blame, except when
proved to have been entered into with actual intent to further
invasion or insurrection."
This is also true
of Federal Reserve Notes which are imposed by
irresistible force on the normal course of life and business. Even
more so, since the Federal Reserve Notes were declared
"legal tender" from June 5, 1933 (as were their
predecessors, the "Greenbacks").
In the same
case, the court said:
"We cannot
doubt that such contracts should be enforced in the courts of the
United States after restoration of peace, to the extent of their just
obligation."
Ibid.
See also, 9 Fed.
Stat. Anno. 237.
Many have contested
the obligations of private contracts on the basis of unlawful
issuance of credit or the medium of exchange designated in the
Contract. We have (through such Contracts) obtained
"substance" with the credit issued (which
indicates that a just obligation arose out of them). We will
find ourselves hard pressed to abrogate such Contracts merely on the
basis of currency designated:
"Transaction
between individuals, which would be legal and binding under ordinary
circumstances, cannot be pronounced illegal and of no obligation
because done in conformity with laws enacted or directions given by
the usurping power. Between these extremes of lawful and unlawful
there is a large variety of transactions to which it is difficult to
apply strictly any general rule; but it may be safely said that
transactions of the usurping authority, prejudicial to the interests
of citizens of other states excluded by the insurrection and by the
policy of the national government from the care and oversight of
their own interests within the states in rebellion cannot be upheld
in the courts of that government."
So, only those
transactions which are specifically intended to support the usurping
power would be considered to have any connection with the usurpation.
In the meantime, those transactions (private in nature) only
made according to irresistible forces imposed upon the parties are
without blame of the parties and binding to their just value.
The bottom line is
- the money issue is a very weak, if not a non-existent argument
in relation to private Contracts. The Constitution applies to
governments interaction with the citizen, but not to citizens
interaction with one another. The use of the Federal Reserve Notes
(imposed upon us by irresistible force) does not give rise to
blame or attachment to the usurping authority.
Although there may
be one exception in the case of "Contracts"
adjudicated in State courts. Under Article I, Section
10, Constitution for the United States of America, "no
state shall make any Thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of
debt" and therefore, it is doubtful that
the State courts would have jurisdiction to enforce
the Contracts (in the case were "Contracts"
make something other than "gold" or "silver"
a tender in payment in debt). Consequently, the State court
could adjudicate the Obligation of the Contract for
Federal Reserve Notes, but could not make
a Judgment in that medium. This situation creates an
interesting paradox when you demand that a State court
define the medium of exchange in a Judgment on a (so-called)
private Contract written in terms of legal tender.
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT - SECTION FIVE
The final section
of the Fourteenth Amendment (as reported in the reprints of
the United States Constitution) claims to authorize:
"The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."
Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 5,
United States
Constitution.
From the words: "of
this article" it would appear to have little meaning. But
an understanding of this Section will lead us to a greater
understanding of this Amendment's repugnance to the original
United States Constitution. We will also see its repugnance to the
Constitutions of the several States and the incompetence of the
legislative bodies which claimed authority to ratify it.
We know that this
provision is identical to Section Two of
the Thirteenth Amendment (which is also of
martial law origin). The import of Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, while being
similar to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment
in some respects, is much different in other respects. The reason
is that the power Clause of each Amendment (while conducive to the
same end) put different powers into force, and when put into
force, they apply to different objects.
The Thirteenth
Amendment was specially designed to operate directly against the
Citizen holding Negroes in subjection. It directly removed
property, or property rights, from the hands of the Citizen mentioned
in the Preamble to the United States Constitution.
As a result, the Thirteenth Amendment is construed
to operate against individuals (in general) as is
legislation made in pursuance thereof. This is not the case
with the Fourteenth Amendment.
"We must not
forget that the province and scope of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments are different; the former simply
abolished slavery; the latter prohibited the status from abridging
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
from depriving them of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, and from denying to any the equal protection of the laws.
The amendments are different, and the powers of Congress under
them are different. What Congress has power to do under one, it may
not have power to do under the other. Under the
Thirteenth Amendment, it has only to do with slavery and
its incidents. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has
power to counteract and render nugatory all state laws and
proceedings which have the effect to abridge any of the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive them of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny any of them the equal protection of the laws. Under the
Thirteenth Amendment, the legislature, so far as
necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery
and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon
the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or
not; under the Fourteenth, as we have already shown, it must
necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character,
addressed to counteract and afford relief against state regulations
or proceedings."
Civil Rights
Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 23;
3 S.Ct. 18;
27 L.Ed. 835.
The Fourteenth
Amendment operates against the States as a whole, that is, either
against the different branches of state government, or the people
(sovereign body) of each State, as a whole, when
acting in their sovereign or legislative political capacity to create
or enforce State law.
Considering that
Congress' powers are enumerated in Article I, Section 8,
Constitution for the United States of America, it is
reasonable to assume that Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment is intended to give Congress new powers or to extend
some existing power beyond the limits established by the original
Constitution. In reference to the Fourteenth Amendment,
the supreme court said:
". . . It is
the power of Congress which has been enlarged. . . ."
Ex Parte,
Virginia, (1879) 100 US 339, 344;
25 L.Ed. 676;
9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 634.
Not only did the
supreme court say that Congress' power was enlarged,
the supreme court also made it clear that it was only
Congress' power that was enlarged and not that of the
general government.
"All of the
amendments derive much of their force from this latter provision.
It is not said that the judicial power of the general
government shall extend to enforce the prohibitions and to protecting
the rights and immunities guaranteed."
Ex Parte,
Virginia, (1879) 100 US 339, 344;
25 L.Ed. 676;
Stat. Anno. 634.
This raises a
peculiar question in relation to this claimed expansion of power on
the part of Congress. If the judicial power is not expanded
by this provision, then, is a court (upon whom
Congress confers jurisdiction) exercising "judicial power"
or the power of the Congress when adjudicating Civil Rights
cases? Any "so-called" court that enforces
legislation under an Amendment with this (or a similar power
Clause) is proceeding as an Article I
legislative Tribunal of Congress, not as an Article III
Judicial Court of the Constitution.
We know from the
Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 7441 that the U.S. Tax
Court is what is known as an Article I (legislative)
Court (tribunal).
"There is
hereby established, under Article I of the Constitution of the
United States, a court of record to be known as the United
States Tax Court. The members of the Tax Court shall be the
chief judge and the judges of the Tax Court."
26 U.S.C. 7441
We also know that
an Article III court, that is, a court that actually exercises
the judicial powers vested by Article III, can be created
by Congress and vested with purely judicial power.
Here we see that
Congress exercises the power to create two different kinds of courts,
however, only one is vested with the judicial powers known to Article
III of the U.S. Constitution. How do these
courts differ? And what power does an Article I Court
depend upon or exercise?
Once Congress has
created an Article III court (and vested it with
specific jurisdiction), it becomes independent of
Congress. Its judges have perpetual term of office as long as they
are in good behavior (Article III, Section 1)
and its Judges may only be removed from office by impeachment
(Article II, Section 4). The Judges of
an Article III court may not have their compensation
diminished during their term of office (Article III,
Section 1). It is only the courts with these
attributes which actually can exercise the judicial power of Article
III of the U.S. Constitution and it is only these courts
which can truly operate within the doctrine of separation of powers,
a doctrine indispensable to our republican form of government.
[Northern Pipe v. Marathon Pipe /].
Since the Officers
of an Article III court may act without retribution for
their actions, the court has both the power and the duty to lay
statutory law next to the Constitution and see if the latter squares
with the former, and if the statutory law does not conform to the
Constitution it must be declared "null" and "void."
[Marbury v. Madison /].
This being the attributes of an Article III court, the same
must have been created by the power granted in Article III.
"The
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in ...
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."
Article III,
Section 1, Const. for U.S. of A.
The words of this
Clause give the courts thereunder the attribute of permanence by the
words "ordained and established", that is, these
courts have a fixed character and they are as perpetual as the Union
itself.
How does an
Article I court differ in character when compared to
an Article III court? And does an
Article I court exercise the lawful judicial power of the
United States?
Article I
contains another reference to Congress' power concerning what
appear to be courts:
"The Congress
shall have power . . . to constitute Tribunals inferior to
the Supreme Court;"
Article I,
Section 8, Clause 9, Const. for U.S. of A.
Notice the
difference in wording between the Clause of Article I and the
Clause of Article III. The latter makes reference to
"courts" (inferior) to the "supreme court"
while the former refers to "Tribunals" inferior
to the "Supreme Court." Article III lays
certain requirements on tenure of office, etc., while Article
I lays no such requirements. So, in Article I we see the
raw power of Congress (without respect to the limitations
the Constitution) places upon the Article III
judicial powers. When that power (judicial power)
is exercised within the confines of Article III, it is said
that the court created is a judicial body exercising a power separate
from the legislature (which is the judicial power conferred and
limited by Article III). It should be noted that as
Article I makes reference to "Tribunals"
inferior to the Supreme Court, the "Supreme Court"
of Article I must also be a "Tribunal"
and thus is not the same "supreme court" of that
in Article III.
It is interesting
to note that the Federal Statutes Annotated, Volume 8, p. 633
(in discussing Article I, Section 8, Clause 9)
only makes mention of Congress' power under Article I
being used within the confines of Article III, that is, up to
1864. Yet, today, we have Tribunals known as Article I courts.
It would seem logical then to deduce that in 1864 (or some time
thereafter) Congress' power was extended in such a manner as to
allow Tribunals to be created by the raw power of Congress
without Article III limitations (and without the
necessity of Article III altogether).
The Fourteenth Amendment was allegedly ratified on
July 9, 1868. In 1879, the supreme court ruled that only
Congress' power was extended by the Amendment (14th).
In relation to the
Tax Court, Congress was allegedly vested with extended power in the
area of taxation (Sixteenth Amendment), and
consequently we have an Article I court with
relation to the tax imposed under that Amendment.
Another point must
be looked at in reference to these questions. Congress has exclusive
legislative power over the District of Columbia:
"The
Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in
all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may . . . become the Seat of the Government
of the United States . . ."
Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17, Const. for U.S. of A.
But this is not the
power that is exercise by Congress under Martial Law Rule of
the Civil War Amendments
Congress also
claims the power to legislate, in certain cases, by implication of
powers specifically granted:
"The
Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper in Execution of the foregoing power, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
Article I,
Section 8, Clause 18, Const. for U.S. of A.
This also is not
the power exercised by Congress under the martial law rule of
the Civil War Amendments. This Clause requires
legislation to be both "necessary" and "proper."
The wording of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18
(requiring Congress legislation to be "proper")
leaves it in the hands of the judicial power to determine
whether Congress action is "constitutional." On the
other hand, the wording of the power Clauses of the Civil War
Amendments (requiring "appropriate" legislation to
enforce the Amendments) leaves it in the hands of Congress
to determine what legislation is "appropriate" as a
political consideration. Consequently, the courts of judicial power
are prevented from determining the constitutionality of
Congress' action under these power Clauses because judicial
Courts have always claimed they cannot decide political questions
without violating the separation of powers. Therefore, without
challenging validity of the entire Amendment, we cannot
challenge the Constitutional validity of any "Act"
of Congress under the Amendment having this type of power
Clause.
Taking all this
into consideration (along with the alleged extension of solely
Congressional power authorized by Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment) it could only be deduced that an
Article I court, (created under this power) exercises
legislative rather than judicial power. Remember, the power of
the judiciary was not extended by Section Five.
If an Article I
court exercises only legislative power, then these courts apparently
do not have the power (as does the Article III court)
to lay a legislative enactment next to the Constitution and declare
its validity or invalidity. This is the design of the Civil War
Amendments and any other Amendment with a similar power Clause.
Being in exercise of merely legislative power, the Article I court
(tribunal) must follow the dictates of the legislature
(Congress) and no other, because it is merely an extension of
the legislature.
How many times have
you heard of Tax Court cases when the Tax Court
has said either, the Constitution is inapplicable,
or that a claim of Constitutional limitations is frivolous?
This alone supports the aforementioned proposition.
This indicates, in
the area of the Thirteenth (and subsequent Amendments),
that all power exercised under them is "legislative"
and any body that exercises powers similar to those of Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, are merely extensions of
the legislature.
Now we see why the
supreme court refers to the power Clause as an enlargement of power
rather than a creation of new power. It is an enlargement because
the extension of martial power is used in conjunction
with previous powers initially conferred upon Congress.
Going back to
Congress' power under Article I, Section 8, Clause
18; look at what the government's own Publication says in
relation to the judiciary in the District of Columbia.
"In the
District of Columbia there is no division of powers between the
general and local government. Congress has the entire control over
the District for every purpose of government, and in organizing a
judicial department, all judicial power necessary for the
purpose of the government may be vested in the courts of justice of
the District."
8 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 659.
All judicial
power? This conveys the fact the Congress may create courts in
the District of Columbia under authority of Article
I without reference to Article III (or any other
provision of the original Constitution). So called Article I
courts are "Tribunals."
Congress has
followed a similar scheme in the case of national Article I
Tribunals and in the case of vesting Article III courts with
the power of Article I Tribunals. This is why there has been
some confusion. Some people believe the Congress has expanded its
jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and its
territories beyond the limitations of the Constitution into the
several States. But this is in error. Congress has expanded
its jurisdiction through the power of Martial Law and
created a whole new venue, a regional venue. This is what
"regionalism" is all about:
"The general
restrictions of the Constitution which govern the exercise of
jurisdiction by the courts of the United States within the several
states of the Union have no operation in the District of Columbia,
and the conditions of jurisdiction existing in the District make
the provisions of section 1 of the Act of 1887, defining the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts in districts within the
several states, plainly inapplicable. General provisions of an
Act of Congress not locally applicable are controlling under the
provisions of Sec. 93, Rev. Stat. D.C."
Gilford Granite
Co. v. Harrison Granite Co.,
23 App. Cas. (DC)
22 (1903).
Under the authority
of Congress to make "municipal law" for the
District of Columbia, Congress need not hold to the
Constitution (as it must with respect to the several States)
nor (it appears) even to the doctrine of "separation
of powers" (which is inapplicable in
the District of Columbia). A similar scheme is
followed in the case of Martial Law "regionalism"
(again creating the aforesaid confusion), the difference
being that judicial courts are prevented from questioning the
"Acts" of Congress under Martial Rule
while in the District of Columbia (the judicial courts had the
power to determine whether Congress had exceeded the limits of
authority related to the District of Columbia).
We know that the
Fourteenth Amendment interferes with the sovereignty the
several States retained prior to its alleged ratification. If
this was a mere expansion of municipal power of the District of
Columbia, the judicial courts would be able to adjudicate the
constitutionality of the expansion of venue and jurisdiction. But
this is not the case. The Fourteenth Amendment places
prohibitions upon the States that never existed before (without
reference to the District of Columbia or other territory of the
United States) which said prohibitions encroach upon State
sovereignty:
"The
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the states
and they are to a degree restrictions of state power."
9 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 631.
Congress' power
allegedly was extended into State sovereignty.
Was Congress' municipal authority over the District of
Columbia extended into the several States to create Article
I courts in the States to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment?
The power exercised is purely "legislative,"
not judicial, but it is not the power over the District of
Columbia, it is national martial law power, (not limited
by Constitutional provisions related to the District of Columbia or
other territory appertaining to the United States).
It's unquestionable
that Congress conferred jurisdiction on the courts of
the United States to hear Civil Rights cases. The
power exercised (being purely Congressional) by any
court which exercises jurisdiction pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, acts as an Article I
Tribunal. You might say: "But Article III courts
were vested with this (civil rights) jurisdiction."
That may be true, but when an Article III court exercises
"legislative power," it must act as
a legislative Tribunal and is reduced to an Article I
Tribunal for the adjudication of such cases.
Either the Tribunal
exercises the power of the legislature or it exercises the power of
the judiciary as a court. The body (tribunal or court) cannot
exercise both "legislative" and "judicial powers"
simultaneously under the original Constitution and since only the
power of Congress is allegedly enlarged by Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a "Tribunal"
cannot exercise both powers under this Clause either.
Who can claim
these Fourteenth Amendment protections and through whom is
this national martial law power of Congress extended into the several
States?
"Until some
state law has been passed, or some state action through its officers
or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor
any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into
activity; ... the amendment was intended to provide against ...
state laws or state action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the
citizen secured by the amendment."
Civil Rights
Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 13,
3 S.Ct. 18,
27 L.Ed. 835;
9 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 631.
"Non-whites"
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
Congress found these "persons" a fit instrument
for spreading their Martial Law jurisdiction throughout the
several States. The unfortunate part of this "for
persons of color" is that they have been led to believe they
are allowed to access the judicial power of the United States
when the truth is that they have only been allowed to access the
arbitrary power of Congress under the Civil War Amendments. This is
why "persons of color" in the United States
continue to feel that they have no rights, because they have no
independent judicial power to protect them.
Thus, Congress
legislates between two or more races. A nation is a race or
vice versa (Title: "Nation",
Webster's Dictionary [1828]). Congress' legislation then is
based on principles of "international law," and
therefore is a form of international law for all intents and
purposes. "Martial law" and "international
law" work well together for Congressional purposes because
they do not respect the authority of the Common-Law.
The exercise of
Martial Law jurisdiction within the several States, is the
usurpation of the Common Law and subjects the sovereign body
(white Citizenry) to a jurisdiction that has no right to exist
within the States.
Furthermore, since
the Amendment (14th) only can invoke
Congress' power (when involving those intended to be
protected thereby, such as the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments), white Citizens have no
rights to sue under this Amendment.
There is, of
course, one exception to this rule. If a white Citizen acquires the
same legal status (artificial character) as those protected by
the Amendment (through the operation of some statutory law of
Congress), then said white Citizen may be brought within the
venue of the Amendment as a statutory (juristic)
person. By this means, white Citizens birthrights become of no
affect and their rights are reduce to the inferior character of
statutory Civil Rights (mere legislative privileges).
It must be
remembered that the white Citizen obtaining this status will also be
"subject to the jurisdiction thereof"
(of the United States Congress) and can legally be
regulated by the laws Congress passed under its Martial Law
authority. Here the extension of municipal laws of Congress outside
the boundaries set by the U.S. Constitution is complete.
By this contrivance (and others emanating from the Fourteenth
Amendment), the States have been reduced to mere
administrative arms and provisional appendages of Congress and
Congress' power has been extended to include the entirety of
the United States.
The difference
between the white man holding citizenship intact according to
the Preamble of the United States Constitution
(and all others who claim protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment), is the difference
between a natural birthright known to the Common-Law (or
privilege, or immunity, guaranteed by the original Constitution)
and a "so called" right, privilege, or immunity,
created by the Constitution and Statute (a privilege or
immunity that never before existed for the party upon whom it was
conferred by statute). The supreme court has recognized that
Congress may protect both:
"A right or an
immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only guaranteed by
it, even without an express delegation of power, may be protected
by Congress."
Strauder v. West
Virginia, (1879) 100 US 303, 310, 25 L.Ed. 664
reversing
State v. Strauder, (1877) 11 W.Va. 745.
But we would
venture to say that a Citizen will find more protection in a
"natural right" than a "privilege"
conferred by Congress. The institution of government was inherently
for the protection of natural rights (Preamble - U.S.
Const.), while the granting of a privilege is merely at the
tolerance of the sovereign body that created government and at the
tolerance of the government the sovereign body created. The main
point is, the courts have recognized that there are both "natural
rights" and those "so called" rights
artificially created by law (privileges).
In fact, State
common law (natural rights) seem to receive no protection.
It should also be noted that where a State government has agreed
to usurp its sovereign body (free white State Citizens)
and show itself disloyal to them by passing legislation in
conformance with the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress' power
is extinguished. In this relation, the U.S. supreme court said:
"When the state
has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; when it has not
made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; when no one of its departments
has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or denied to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws; when on the contrary, the laws
of the state, are enacted by its legislative, and construed by
its judicial, and administered by its executive departments recognize
and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no
duty an confers no power upon Congress."
U.S. v. Harris,
(1882) 106 U.S. 629, 632,
1 S.Ct. 601,
27 L.Ed. 290.
In other words,
when State martial law is imposed within the State to enforce
National martial law, Congress has no reason to exercise its
martial law powers.
If a State has
conformed to the new Order, there is no need for Congress
to intervene. And if a white Citizen has not obtained the
standing of a former slave by petitioning Congress for
admittance to venue and jurisdiction of the Fourteenth Amendment
(i.e. statutory character of "person"), then
Congress has no power over that individual under this Clause (Amend.
14, Sec. 5). /
With all that has
been said about the Fourteenth Amendment in this exposé,
the ultimate question remains: "Is the Fourteenth
Amendment a part of the United States?" Or,
rather, "Is it constitutionally a part of our organic law?"
The original
Resolution which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment
to the several States legislatures for ratification contained a
Clause which does not appear in the reprints of the United States
Constitution:
"Be it
resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, (two thirds of
both Houses concurring). That the following Article be
proposed to the legislatures of the several States as an Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three
fourths of said legislatures, shall be valid as a part of the
Constitution, namely: - Article XIV . . ."
14 Stat. 358
(1866).
In looking into the
Constitutionality of this Amendment (14th), we
must look to see who proposed it; who ratified it; and if the power
was actually vested in those bodies by the people of the United
States of America in national Constitution to lawfully do so.
From the foregoing
Preamble to the Resolution proposing the
Fourteenth Amendment, we can see that Congress proposed
it, and it was intended that the several States legislatures would
ratify it.
There is a great
deal of recorded history that shows the unscrupulous way in which the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was achieved. The
basic disloyalties, the martial law, and political
usurpations that took place after the Civil War are revealed by
history to be:
Military
occupation of the several southern States under declaration by
Congress, that the southern State governments were not valid, even
though they had just been allowed to ratify the Thirteenth
Amendment;
Franchisement
of non-citizens (basically Negroes) into the body politic;
Disfranchisement
of white Citizens (members of the sovereignty) from the
body politic;
Institution,
through a military government, of predominantly Negro legislatures
(while Negroes were not citizens); and
The
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by these non-citizen
legislatures in the southern States, after the lawful legislatures
(which existed prior to military occupation) had
rejected this same Amendment.
There are no
doubts that these are the historical facts. Let us now take a look
at the legal side of the question.
We know several
things about the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to Congress
and the prohibitions laid against Congress by the original
Constitution for the United States of America, (including
the Bill of Rights). We know what the Amendment was
designed to do and that it does the following things:
It
violates the Preamble, which defines the whole intent
of all powers granted to Congress, by introducing a foreign member
into the sovereign body.
It
is an "ex post facto law" punishing Southerners
in many ways for acts not necessarily illegal at the time of their
commission.
It
is a "bill of attainder" (in its lesser form of
a "bill of pains and penalties") depriving all
southern slave holders of property without trial.
It
deprived Southerners of property by unreasonable seizure and
without just compensation, bringing Congress beyond limitations set
out by the Fourth and Fifth Articles in Amendment
(Bill of Rights).
It
lays prohibitions upon the States beyond those known to the original
Constitution of the United States and makes inroads upon the
Constitutions of the several States, encroaching upon
sovereignty belonging to the people of the several States which
is prohibited by the Tenth Article in Amendment
(Bill of Rights).
It
created purely legislative "Tribunals" without
respect to the separation of powers.
It
extended Congress' "martial law power" allowing the
emission of "bills of credit" and etc..
The
list is too long to completely enumerate. (Refer back within
this exposé to list more Constitutional violations)
We know that the
United States government is one of enumerated powers only, and that
specific prohibitions were placed on those powers by Article I,
Section 9 and the Articles of the Bill of Rights
(as well as other provisions of the United States Constitution).
Of course, the main
points we are interested in are the prohibitions laid on Congress.
Congress has no power to pass any "bill of attainder"
or "ex post facto law" to make law which
unreasonably deprives a Citizen of "property" or
deprives the Citizen of "security in his person or effects;"
to encroach upon a State's sovereignty retained at the adoption of
the United States Constitution, or to make any law
taking property for public use without just compensation.
The fact is,
Congress exceeded the powers granted to it and violated prohibitions
laid against it (in several areas) and had absolutely no
right, power, or authority to propose such legislation and could only
claim an exception through a similarly unlawful Act,
the Second Section of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Thus we find that we will have to show the Thirteenth
Amendment to be invalid and unconstitutional, and in fact,
not a part of the Constitution in order to judicially destroy
the Fourteenth Amendment (at least with respect
to the power of Congress as regards the proposing the Fourteenth
Amendment).
But now let us take
into consideration who actually claimed the power to ratify
the Fourteenth Amendment, the State legislatures.
We know everyone in government claims the Fourteenth
Amendment is a part of the Constitution because it was
ratified according to the provisions of Article V of the
original U.S. Constitution which says that three fourths
of the legislatures may ratify an Amendment to the Constitution and
thus make the Amendment part of the organic law, but can the
legislatures of the several States constitutionally make
ratifications in all instances?
According to the
principles upon which our form of government is founded and
considering who originally ratified the Constitution, the answer to
this question must be in the "negative" as a matter
of law. We start to see the evidence in the law immediately with
Article V of the Constitution for the United
States of America.
". . .
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the year
one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner effect
the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the
first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."
Article V, Const.
for U.S. of A..
Here we see two
specific exceptions to the law of Amendment contained in Article V.
Many times, the courts have ruled that when specific exemption
is provided in the Constitution, that none other exists. In
this case, that construction will not properly apply, especially
since those exceptions applied both to the State legislature
and Conventions of People of the several States.
When the
construction of the Constitution is doubtful or the language
ambiguous, resort may be made to other portions of the Constitution
and finally to the "Convention Notes" and
the "Federalist Papers." Article V
contains two methods of amending the Constitution;
". . . by
the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: . .
."
Article V, Const.
for U.S. of A.
Why were the two
modes of ratification provided for? Is it possible that cases
might arise where it was absolutely necessary for Conventions of the
several States to ratify an Amendment instead of the several State
legislatures? And if an Amendment required ratification by
Conventions of the people of the several States, could Congress
expect a lawful and constitutional ratification from the legislatures
of the several States? Furthermore, even if Congress could
recommend either mode of ratification, could the State
legislatures lawfully and constitutionally make this ratification
when it affected the Constitution of the State which created them?
These are valid and important questions which must be answered as a
matter of, and according to law, (in relation to Article V
and the two modes of ratification). These questions
consequently leave the language of Article V in
somewhat of an ambiguous state.
To find the answer
to these important questions, we will start at the beginning,
the creation of our government. Justice Taney in Dred
Scott v. Sandford /
relates the history of the beginning of our government and the
meaning of the Preamble to the United States
Constitution. Therein we find (as we do in the
words of the Preamble) that the sovereign people
("We the People") adopted [ratified]
the Constitution and it was on their authority (as the sovereign
bodies, in their respective States) that
the General Government was formed (and that it was
formed for their protection, as well as the protection of their
posterity).
Some might say that
the Constitution for the United States of America could as easily
have been ratified by the legislatures of the several States; but if
this is true, why does history (as well as the Constitution)
reflect that it was ratified by the people in Conventions of the
several States instead? /
The fact is, the legislatures of the several States had no
lawful authority to ratify the United States Constitution.
The Convention related the legal reason why the
Constitution had to be ratified by the people instead of the
legislatures. The following remarks were made with reference to
Article VII, Constitution for the United States of America.
". . . Madison
thought them essential and remarked that otherwise in cases of
conflicts between laws of the States and of Congress, the courts of
the former might decide in favor of their own laws; and he remarked
further that it might be asserted that the Union was a mere treaty
among independent States, and therefore a breach of any one article
absolved the other parties from the whole obligation,"
8 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 243.
Here, Madison
thought the peoples ratification necessary to the supremacy Clause
of Article VI. Knowing this, (contrary to the ruling
of the supreme court of the United States in Neal v.
Delaware /),
the supremacy Clause of the national Constitution
could not be applied the Amendments which made inroads into
the Constitutions of the several States (and which were only
ratified by State legislatures).
Question:
"Is this why the several States have been coerced to amend
their own Constitutions consistent with national martial law
Amendments?"
Question:
"Is this why the provisional States, such as the provisional
State of Washington, were induced into placing a
provision in the (so-called) State Constitution
making the United States Constitution the Supreme Law of the Land?"
[Washington Constitution (1889), Article I,
Section 2.]
If the State
Constitutions declare the national Constitution "supreme,"
then the supremacy Clause of the national Constitution will
not come into play in adjudication's concerning
the Civil War Amendments (and like
Amendments).
If the State
Constitutions adopt the provisions that are consistent with
the Civil War Amendments (and like
Amendments) then, again, the application of
supremacy Clause of the national Constitution will not be
questioned concerning conflicts of law between the States and
the United States, because there will be no conflict of law.
Later in the Convention:
"Governour
Morris argued that, as no alteration could be made under
the Confederation without unanimous consent, and change in the
proposed Constitution not made in accordance with this provision,
must be held void by the judges as unconstitutional, if the
reference would be made to the legislatures; while, if the
reference should be made to the people of the United States, the
federal compact may be altered by a majority of them."
8 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 243.
Morris
understood that the people were sovereign above the several
State legislatures. Finally, Madison made the most
important legal argument showing that the States legislatures were
incompetent to ratify the Constitution for the United States
of America and this argument still applies today.
"Madison
thought the legislatures clearly incompetent, for the very changes
proposed would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions, and
a legislature cannot change the Constitution under which it exists.
The difference between a system founded on the legislature only
and one founded on the people is, he said, that between a league or
treaty and a Constitution."
8 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 243, 244.
While all the other
Conventioneers arguments related to the Articles of Confederation,
Madison was capable of showing the absolute legal incompetence
of the State legislatures to ratify the national Constitution. If a
State legislature allows inroads to be made upon the
Constitution under which it exists (by ratification of a
national Constitution, much less an Amendment thereto), it
is Constitutionally incompetent to pass upon the legislation. This
is consistent with the principles of a Constitutional
Republic where the institutions of government cannot change the
organic law of the people under which the government legally exists.
Only the sovereign body (the people) can act upon such
legislation because it is "organic law"
(extraordinary legislation), not mere ordinary legislation.
We have seen the
inroads that the Fourteenth Amendment made on the
Constitutions of the several States, whether they were southern or
northern. With the possible exception of one or two States,
this Amendment (14th) made inroads into all
State Constitutions under which the State legislatures
existed when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here, the reason for two methods of ratification comes to light
in the first instance:
It may be said that
the "Notes" on the Convention are not
a reliable source of construction of the Constitution. And in
certain cases, this may be true. But not here! The supreme court
(as in Dred Scott v. Sandford, /
[supra.]) has said that legislation most recent to the
adoption of the Constitution lays closest to the foundation of the
organic law and must be accorded the necessary respect due according
to the era of their enactment. Obviously, this is true
(considering that such legislation is contemporary to the organic
law), that is, it is contemporary to a time when the original
intent was foremost in the minds of the Officials of government, both
State and Federal.
Article V
had at least one primary purpose in the Constitution. In the
Convention it was agreed that a provision should
be made in the Constitution so that the several States
might add a Bill of Rights to the U.S.
Constitution as a condition of its adoption.
Pursuant to this
proposition of the Convention (and with the
understanding that a Bill of Rights could be
added), Conventions of the People of the several States ratified
the Constitution and proceeded to propose Articles of the Bill
of Rights to be added accordingly.
In the Preamble
to the Bill of Rights (seldom found reprinted in any
Constitution, whether printed by the federal government or private
parties), we find the first impression of the several States, as
to the purpose of Article V, Constitution for the United
States of America.
The Bill of
Rights was ratified by the legislatures of the several States;
and of this there is no doubt. Obviously, both Congress and the
several States legislatures believed they had the power to make the
ratification. When we look at the Preamble to the
Bill of Rights, we see under what circumstance the
power was believed to exist:
"THE
Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their
adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declarative and
restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of
public confidence in the Government will best insure the beneficent
ends of its institution.
"RESOLVED by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, two thirds of the Houses, that
the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the
several States as Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, all or any of which Articles when ratified by three
fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and
purposes as part of the said Constitution. vis!
"ARTICLES in
addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures
of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original
Constitution."
Preamble to
the Bill of Rights, U.S. Constitution.
So the Bill of
Rights (as ratified by the State legislatures) was
ratified with the intention of limiting the federal government to the
power granted to it, for the preservation of the powers of
the several States and the individual Citizen's natural rights.
Here, the legislatures of the several States did not attempt to
expand the powers of Congress (by inroads into their own
respective Constitutions), but, instead, ratified the added
assurance that Congress would not usurp its powers in deprivation of
the powers of the several States or the people of the several States
respectively. [Articles Nine and Ten in Amendment].
If we read Hans
v. Louisiana, /
we find that the State legislatures again ratified an Amendment
of the United States Constitution with the same purpose, that is
the Eleventh Amendment. Not until the
Thirteenth Amendment were the powers of
Congress so
widely expanded, or
for that matter, expanded at all by an alleged Amendment to
the Constitution. Going back to the assertions of Madison
in the Convention; "Where did the legislatures of
the several States derive power to ratify any Amendment which
made inroads into the Constitution under which they existed?"
The power, in itself, would be "nugatory."
Obviously, Article
V provides for ratification of an Amendment by Conventions of the
People of the several States for occasions such as this. In fact,
the principles upon which the federal Constitution was founded
absolutely demand that such Amendments be ratified by the people
rather than the State legislatures. No legislative body has the
power to change the organic law and its relation to the sovereign
body (Nation) that created it. Only the sovereign people,
themselves, have the power to add to its members a new class of
persons.
As a result, we see
that no competent body purposed nor ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
(or any like Amendment affecting the sovereign body),
that said Amendment is not a part of
the Constitution for the United States of America, and that
the Amendment (and like Amendments)
are absolutely unconstitutional in this respect. They are
not Amendments of our Constitution.
Not only do the
Amendments discussed herein (such as the
Fourteenth Amendment) make inroads into State
Constitutions (especially where the States have a Bill of
Rights similar to that of the Constitution for the United
States of America), but the several State legislatures
are also prohibited by "the people"
in the Constitution for the United States of America,
itself, from enacting (ratifying) such legislation into law.
Article I,
Section 10, Constitution for the United States of America,
lays prohibitions on the several States (similar to those
laid against the United States government in Article I,
Section 9, Constitution for the United States of America)
with one further prohibition; the several States have no power
to violate the "Obligations of Contract"
by laws enacted in the State. As we previously discussed, many
"bills of sale" (executed Contracts)
that were violated by the Thirteenth Amendment were
sanctioned to be violated by adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Not only are the
State legislatures prohibited by their own respective
State Constitutions from passing such legislation, but they are
also prohibited by the Constitution for the United States of
America from passing such legislation into law, Organic or otherwise.
We find no repeal of those original prohibitions at any time before
or after the alleged adoption of the Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendments.
The bottom line is
that the State legislatures were, and are, incompetent to ratify
the Fourteenth Amendment for no power of ratification
having existed in the bodies to whom it was presented.
Another point to
address is the 14th Amendment to the Constitution for the
United States of America is not an "Amendment,"
it is a "Revision."
Case law is
evidently unanimous in support of the view that there is a
distinction of substance between the concept of "Amendment"
and "Revision" and that some proposed constitutional
changes can only be accomplished by revision. /
The line between changes which are permissible as "Amendments"
and those which must necessarily be "Revisions"
cannot be drawn with precision. In general, changes which are
"few and simple and independent" can be
considered Amendments, whereas "sweeping change"
requires the Revision process. /
The case of McFadden is instructive on the distinction
between "Amendment" and "Revision."
Quoting from an earlier case, the McFadden court discussed
revisions made by a Convention in which "the entire
sovereignty of the people is represented . . ." Id.
at 789.
"The character
and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that body is freed
from an limitations other than those contained in the constitution of
the United States. . . the very term 'constitution'
implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of
the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as
well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand,
the significance of the term 'amendment' implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as
will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed." /
McFadden v.
Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 789
The court held that
the measure in question was so "far reaching
and multifarious" that it was revisory rather than
amendatory in nature. /
The court listed numerous sections of the Constitution which the
measure in question would affect. /
This review demonstrated:
". . . the
wide and diverse range of subject matters proposed to be voted upon,
and the revisional effect which it would necessarily have on our
basic plan of government. The proposal is offered as a
single amendment but it obviously is multifarious. It does not
give the people an opportunity to express approval or disapproval
severally as to each major change suggested. . . ."
McFadden v.
Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 796-97
In Adams v.
Gunter, /
the court opined that amendment as distinct from revision authority
"includes only the power to amend any section in such a
manner that such Amendment, if approved, would be complete within
itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other
section of Articles of the Constitution or require further Amendments
to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose." /
The above
authorities quoted merely suggest factors that should be considered
in determining whether a proposed constitutional change is
"amendatory" or "revisory."
The 14th Amendment addresses multifarious issues
ranging from status of citizenship, disqualification of
representatives,
taxes,
apportionment of representatives, and the debt of the United States.
And taking into consideration what we have studied,
the 14th Amendment has altered more than one Article
of the Constitution for the United States of America.
The bottom line is
that Congress was and is incompetent to make "Revisions"
to the Constitution for the United States of America, that the
14th Amendment is absolutely unconstitutional and
therefore "null and void" ab initio for no
power of "Revision" exist in the Congress.
We cannot emphasize
enough that, as a matter of law, there is no Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution for the United States and that even if
there were, it would have absolutely no lawful application to
the individual free white Citizens of the several States.
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
The Law
Martial
Introduction
In this exposé,
we have briefed the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
for the United States of America and the powers
acquired by Congress thereunder to impose Law Martial
upon the States. What most people don't realize is that they have
been under Martial Law Rule for over 60 years.
/
The case of Ex
parte Milligan, /
is where our study of the Law-Martial begins wherein
the United States supreme court lists and explains three forms
of Martial-Law. Like it or not, we have to deal with
these three forms:
Full Martial Law.
Martial Law Proper.
Martial Law Rule.
Full
Martial Law is when a Declaration of Martial Law
is issued, and military troops are put in the streets to
control a region or district with military force. The federal
armed forces with the National Guard are on every street corner
enforcing military jurisdiction on every Citizen of the Nation.
This form is only supposed to be used when the Nation is at War, a
declared War by Congress, and should only be used on foreign
soil unless the country is actually invaded by some foreign power or
to put down an armed rebellion too large to be dealt with by the
civil authorities or powers of our constitutional government.
The first
indication of imposition of Full Martial Law (with
the exception of the troops actually in the streets wielding their
military power), is the suspension of the constitutional civil
judicial power to enforce the rights of liberty with the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus. This is clear from the
American Constitutions (both State and federal) which
generally provide that this great bulwark of liberty may not be
suspended except upon declaration of the legislature that the public
safety require it due to rebellion or invasion. [For example,
Const. for U.S. of A., Article 1, Section 9,
Clause 2.] The cause that allows suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is the only
cause for imposition of Full Martial Law.
Martial
Law Proper is the law governing the internal operation of
the armed forces. It is this law that is followed to control
military command of armed forces. For example, it is the law used to
enforce an "Order" of a Sergeant upon a Private. It
is the law that is enforced by Courts Martial.
Martial-Law
Rule is the law of necessity and emergency. This form
allows a domestic use of martial law powers, but only for as long as
the necessity or emergency exist. The most dangerous thing
about this form of Martial Law is that this form of
Martial Law is used during times of peace.
Called by some
writers on the subject (and termed such by a
few Constitutions) - the "Law Martial,"
this jurisdiction has existed since the United States
Constitution was first established. The Congress and the
President of the United States have argued since the
beginning on how far the Law-Martial power can be exercised by
both branches of the government. The United States
Constitution and the State Constitutions authorize the power to
exist, but they do not necessarily define its proper or legitimate
use. Should the Law Martial power be abused by
the Executive and/or the Legislative Branches (when the
Judicial Branch will not check the abuse of the Law Martial
powers), the people (being confused) become alarmed and
begin to disobey the Statutes authorized under the powers of the
Law Martial.
Any one of the
three forms (used strictly for the purpose they were structured
for) would be (according to the United States supreme Court)
constitutional. It appears that it is the third form of the Law
Martial [Martial Law Rule] that could be and is
used to destroy the letter and spirit of the original
United States Constitution. It is also the third form
[Martial Law Rule] that can be administered as to lead
the people to believe that the Government is administering
constitutional law when in fact, the Government is administering
Martial-Law Rule under the appearance of constitutional
law.
Try as the
government may, the people smell a rat. The "Federal Tax
Laws" is the first line of disobedience by the people. The
people for the last fifty years have in large numbers disobeyed
the tax laws (particularity the "Personal
Federal Income Tax") which is claimed by these people
to be "un-Constitutional." Many have come
forth with their claims to the un-Constitutionality of the tax laws
and have failed. Have they failed because they have not understood
that the "Federal Personal Income Tax" is
within a military venue and is enforced under
a Martial Law Jurisdiction? The Government
seizes their property without "Court Orders."
The Government seizes their bank accounts without "Court
Orders" and the Government seizes their wages without
"Court Orders." The people just can't seem to
grasp the source of power that the Government is exercising. If
they read General Order No. 100 by Abraham Lincoln,
they will discover the source of their problem.
=============================
INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD
The following
material is part of Instructions For The Government of Armies
of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis
Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100
by President Lincoln, (24 April 1863). General
Orders No. 100 can be found published in the book The
Law of Armed Conflicts, Third Ed., Edited by Dietrich
Schindler and Jiri Toman, wherein its inclusion was
explained as follows:
The Lieber
Instructions represent the first attempt to codify the laws
of war. They were prepared during the American Civil War
by Francis Lieber, then a professor of Columbia
College in New York, revised by a board of officers and
promulgated by President Lincoln. Although they
were binding only on the forces of the United States, they
correspond to a great extend to the laws and customs of war existing
at that time. The Lieber Instructions strongly influenced the
further codification of the laws of war and the adoption of similar
regulations by other states. They formed the origin of the project of
an international convention on the laws of war presented to the
Brussels Conference in 1874 (No. 2) and stimulated
the adoption of the Hague Conventions on land warfare of 1899
and 1907 (No's. 7 and 8). - [The Law of
Armed Conflicts, p. 3].
The
Law of Armed Conflicts also lists as sources of the published
text in English as follows:
Instructions for
the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., Originally Issued as
General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General's Office 1863,
Washington 1898, Government Printing Office; Francis Lieber,
Contributions to Political Science, Including Lectures on the
Constitution of the United States and Other Papers, Miscellaneous
Writings, Vol. II, 1881, p. 245; Wilson - Tucker pp.
VI-XXXVI; Friedman. pp. 158-186.
For the purpose of
this exposé, we will quote only those Articles
of the Lieber Instructions (with comments)
that affect us on a day to day basis.
=============================
SECTION I
Martial
Law - Military jurisdiction - Military necessity - Retaliation
Art.
1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in
consequence of the occupation, under the Martial Law of the invading
or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or
any public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not.
Martial Law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of
occupation or conquest. The presence of a hostile army proclaims its
Martial Law.
NOTE: Is
there a hostile army presence in every State in the Union,
enforcing Martial-Law jurisdiction on the Citizens of the
several States? Has America been taken by conquest? According
to the United States Supreme Court in Texas v. White,
(1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 721, the court ruled the
Civil War was not a war of conquest. If the civil war was
not a war of conquest, then we are under one of the forms of the
Law Martial. We must be under occupation. The above
Article does not say the Nation has to be under occupation by a
foreign nation's army. In and after the Civil War, Citizens of this
Nation were under the Law-Martial and occupation of the Union
Army. The fact is, we must prove today that the several States are
under occupation by a domestic army to prove that the Citizens are
under the Law Martial Jurisdiction.
Citizens see this
domestic Army of Occupation every day, but don't recognize them as
the Military Police. This domestic Army is on every street of every
State in this Union. Citizens don't recognize this Army because the
Army hides behind a Vail of secrecy, what appears to be a civilian
uniform. To unveil this Army, the people need to look up the
State Statutes on the term: "Peace Officer."
Every State in the Union has a Statute establishing "Peace
Officers." The term: "Peace Officer" in
these Statutes means: the Military Police of the State.
The "Military Police of the State" is not the State
Militia.
Examine your State,
County, and City Police. All of the civil police officers are
statutorily defined as a single form of "Officer,"
a "Peace Officer." Do local police units have
military ranks such as "Sergeants," "Captains,"
"Lieutenants," and "Quartermasters?"
Have you ever heard the police refer to people as "civilians?"
What National flag and/or State Flag is displayed at your local
police department? The County Sheriff Deputies in Oregon wear
the yellow fringe National Flag patch on their uniforms. Are you
beginning to recognize the troops of occupation on every street of
this Union? Are you under occupation? When a local policeman
enforces a curfew (as they are across this Nation today),
is the policeman enforcing the curfew as a Sheriff's Deputy,
State Policeman, or City Policeman, or are all three enforcing the
curfew as "Peace Officers" i.e. "State
Military Police?" The answer falls in the Statute or
Ordinance they are enforcing. "Curfew" is strictly
under a Martial Law jurisdiction. How many other State
Statutes, or County/City Ordinances have been enacted by
the State Legislators, County Commissioners, and City Councils, under
Martial Law Jurisdiction?
One more point.
The "Military Police" must have a "Military Venue"
to perform as the "State Military Police." The
State Regional Areas under Metro-Government provide the Military
Venue for the Peace Officers to enforce Martial Law Jurisdiction.
Now, can you understand that the Nation is under occupation?
Art. 2.
Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by
special proclamation, ordered by the commander in chief; or by
special mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the
occupation of a place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of
peace as one of the conditions of the same.
NOTE: There
is no treaty of peace between the Union and the several States
that is know of and the end of full martial law was finally declared
by withdrawal of troops in the streets, but repeal of all forms of
the law martial has never been declared.
Art.
3. Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension,
by the occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil
law, and of the domestic administration and government in the
occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule
and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws,
as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution,
or dictation.
The
commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all
civil and penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, as in
times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.
NOTE: Under
the Law-Martial, only the criminal jurisdiction of a Military Court
is the recognized law. But as Article Three says, "the civil
courts can continue wholly or in part as long as the civil
jurisdiction does not violate the Military orders laid down by the
Commander in Chief or one of his Commanders." By this
means; a military venue, jurisdiction, and authority are imposed upon
the occupied populace under disguise of the ordinary civil courts and
officers of the occupied district or region, because the so-called
civil authorities in an occupied district, or region, only act at the
pleasure of a military authority.
It should also be
noted here that the several State Legislatures, County Boards
of Commissioners, and City Councils, are constantly legislating
to please the edicts of the federal government (the occupying
force) and that their legislation, in this sense, is not an
exercise of State sovereignty, but instead, a compliance
with edicts of the military force which occupies the several
States and consequently are edicts of Martial Law
Rule.
Art.
4. Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in
accordance with the laws and usage's of war. Military
oppression is not Martial Law: It is the abuse of the power which
that law confers. As Martial Law is executed by military force, it
is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by
the principles of justice, honor, and humanity - virtues adorning a
soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he
possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.
NOTE: What
is being said is abuse of the Martial Law power is not
considered Martial Law. We agree. It's called TREASON.
(See Article III, Sec. 3, U.S.
Const.). Meanwhile (under this principle), the
Officers operating under Martial Law Rule are
required to act in strict accordance with Statutes and Regulations
under which Martial Law Rule is imposed. That is why
"Statutory Tribunals" (courts) will declare the
acts of "Peace Officers" statutorily defective
in some cases, but at the same time, refuse to impose
constitutional limitations. Basically, when a Tribunal
declares that a "Peace Officer" failed to
follow the requirements of a Statute, what that Tribunal has done is
declared that the "Peace Officer" failed to follow
the Rules of War while exercising a Martial Law
power and therefore, was not justified in his acts.
Art.
5. Martial Law should be less stringent in places and countries
fully occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may
be exercised in places or regions where actual hostilities exist,
or are expected and must be prepared for. Its most complete sway is
allowed - even in the commander's own country - when face to face
with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the case, and
of the paramount duty to defend the country against invasion. To
save the country is paramount to all other considerations.
NOTE: The
above Article Five can also be understood to save a
Martial-Law system as paramount to all other considerations.
As long as the system survives without armed hostility against it,
Martial Law is imposed in the milder form of Martial
Law Rule, but the minute any armed hostility is raised or
threatened against the occupying force, full Martial Law
is again imposed with troops in the streets to enforce Martial Law
authority. Do the Los Angeles and Chicago riots ring a bell?
How about Waco and Ruby Ridge?
Art.
6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual
course in the enemy's places and territories under Martial Law,
unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military
power; but all the functions of the hostile government -
legislative executive, or administrative - whether of a general,
provincial, or local character, cease under Martial Law, or continue
only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of
the occupier or invader.
NOTE: Thus,
it appears that the State Legislatures and local governmental units
in the several States are still operating under a Constitutional
authority, when in fact, they are operating at the pleasure of, or
with the sanction of, the Commander in Chief of the occupying
force. Take a look at the legislation and court decisions in your
State and you will find that more than not, the legislation and court
decisions are designed to please the edict of the federal government
in matters such as the Civil War Amendments.
Art. 7.
Martial Law extends to property, and to persons, whether they are
subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.
NOTE: All
the "non-resident alien" pleaders can trash their
argument. Under any of the three forms of the Law-Martial,
it just doesn't matter.
Art.
8. Consuls, among American and European nations, are not
diplomatic agents. Nevertheless, their offices and persons will
be subjected to Martial Law in cases of urgent necessity only:
their property and business are not exempted. Any delinquency they
commit against the established military rule may be punished as in
the case of any other inhabitant, and such punishment furnishes no
reasonable ground for international complaint.
NOTE: All
the "Ambassadors of God" pleaders just got trashed
by Article Eight.
Art.
9. The functions of Ambassadors, Ministers, or other diplomatic
agents accredited by neutral powers to the hostile government, cease,
so far as regards the displaced government; but the conquering or
occupying power usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to
itself.
Art.
10. Martial Law affects chiefly the police and collection of
public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government
or by the invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of
the army, its safety, and the safety of its operations.
NOTE: As we
have said, the Federal Personal Income Tax is collected
under a Military Venue within a Martial-Law
jurisdiction. Federal Reserve Notes are Military Scrip
circulated within a Military Venue. The problem
is the people don't understand how the entire United States is
covered by a Military Venue. The first Military Venue
covering the entire United States was brought into existence through
the Social Security Act. Under the Social
Security Act, there was brought into existence Ten
Federal Regional Areas. These ten federal regional areas
are the same as a military base. It is not unconstitutional to
circulate "military scrip" on a military base
as the base is considered to be a military venue. "Military scrip"
cannot circulate in the civil jurisdiction of the several States. To
get around this Constitutional bar, the Congress (via
the Social Security Act), created Ten Military Venues,
called "Federal Regional Areas." The problem
the Congress realized was, while Congress could restructure the
Government Agencies into these Federal Regional Areas,
the people could not be identified to be within this
Military Venue by their own consent. The
solution was to create another Military Venue
which would trick the people to voluntarily accept recognition that
they are within a Military Venue. Congress solved
this problem by creating the ZIP CODE.
The "zip
code" divides the United States into Ten Military
Venues called "National Areas."
When a Citizen receives mail from an agency of the federal government
(such as the I.R.S.), in the return address of the
federal agency is the district within the regional area the letter is
sent from, and on the address of the "Citizen"
it was sent to is the national area [ZIP] in which he
received the correspondence from the I.R.S.. In other words,
the correspondence was sent from one of the federal regional areas
[military venue] to one of the National Areas
[another military venue]. "Taxing Districts"
are established within one of the Federal Regional
Areas, which places the collection of taxes under
a martial law jurisdiction.
Military commanders
can set up "taxing districts" in an occupied region.
In the United States, the President (who is the
Commander in Chief of the Military) has been authorized to
set up Internal Revenue Taxing Districts, ever
since the Civil War. [see 26 U.S.C. § 7621].
Art.
11. The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad
faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy during the war,
but also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the
belligerents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in
force in case of war between the contracting powers.
It
disclaims all extortion's and other transactions for individual gain;
all acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts.
Offenses
to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so if
committed by officers.
NOTE: Here
is the basis for Title 42 suits (Title 42, United States
Code), and the reason why 99% of Title 42 suits
fail. The Title 42 guru's never get the point. They are
trying to sue what they call "Executive Officers"
(assuming these Officers are in the civil jurisdiction of a
State or the civil jurisdiction of the United States [who,
in reality, are "Military Officers" (Peace
Officers) protected from liability for Constitutional violations
as they are not bound to the Articles of the Constitutions (State
or Federal) but rather, are bound to the Rules of War]).
As an example, President Clinton says he can't be forced to
court by a woman who is suing him as he is protected in his capacity
as Commander in Chief. Of course, the Articles of
the Federal Constitution or the Articles of the State
Constitutions, (and their Bill of Rights) do not
apply to Officers within a Military Venue.
These Officers (appearing as "Executive Officers"
of the States or Federal Government)
are "Peace Officers" and can only be
charged if they violate Article 6 of these Orders,
(or any other Articles under this Order regulating their duties).
Under Military Rules, Title 42 suitors
have no Constitutional charges to bring against a Military Officer
under the Rules of Occupation.
Art. 13.
Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred
and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the
common law of war. Military offenses under the statute law
must be tried in the manner therein directed; but military offenses
which do not come within the statute must be tried and punished under
the common law of war. The character of the courts which exercise
these jurisdictions depends upon the local laws of each particular
country.
In
the armies of the United States, the first is exercised by
courts-martial, while cases which do not come within the "Rules
and Articles of War," or the jurisdiction conferred by
statute on courts martial, are tried by military commissions.
NOTE: As
you can see, some regulations are by Acts of Congress
and some regulations are the acts of the Commander in Chief
(or one of his Commanders). The most interesting part of
this Article is the reference to the "common law of
war." Is this the "federal common law" the
federal courts are referring to?
Art.
15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life
or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose
destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the
war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every
enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar
danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property,
and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or
communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of
life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's
country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army,
and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith
either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during
the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take
up arms against one another in public, war do not cease on this
account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.
NOTE:
Article 15 sounds like the creed of the I.R.S.. Under this
Article, would the I.R.S. be exercising "Federal
Common Law?"
Art.
16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the
infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor
of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to
extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in
any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits
of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general,
military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes
the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.
NOTE:
GRANT, Sherman, and bloody Buttler must have
missed reading Article 16.
This Article
admits that it is perfectly fine to deceive the occupied populace
into believing they are governed by their own civil government, while
in reality, they are being governed behind the scenes by a
military force. Such deception provides the greatest
opportunity for military occupation without hostility (under the
pretense that no occupation or hostility exists). Simply put, if
you can control peoples minds, you don't have to control their
bodies. One who doesn't believe he lost his liberty will never break
out in open hostility to restore it. Such deception provides the
maximum amount of control of the occupied region with the minimum
expenditure of resources, and is geared to avoid "any
act of hostility which makes the return to peace (or the
appearance of peace) unnecessarily difficult."
Art.
17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve
the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the
speedier subjection of the enemy.
NOTE: Is
Article 17 justification for the depression of 1929?
Justification for leading people to believe they cannot work or
survive without being a member of Social Security?
Justification for leading the people to believe that they cannot
function without permission of government officials at every turn?
Justification for depriving any aspect of Life, Liberty, or
Property (pursuit of happiness), without the due process
of law required by constitutional limitations, both State
and federal?
Art.
18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the
noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those who
consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme
measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.
NOTE: Is
this authority to regulate the farmers to bring about
their surrender?
Art.
22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last
centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war
on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to
a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in
arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the
unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as
much as the exigencies of war will admit.
NOTE:
Article 22 must have been written for the cowards who live in
fear of the occupiers and the people.
Art.
26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil
officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary
allegiance or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious government
or rulers, and they may expel everyone who declines to do so.
But whether they do so or not, the people and their civil
officers owe strict obedience to them as long as they hold sway over
the district or country, at the peril of their lives.
NOTE:
Article 26 is a mouth full. The "Order" that
the State Officials is take an Oath to uphold the Fourteenth
Amendment, or be expelled from office, comes to mind.
Isn't strict obedience of the State Officials what
the United States Supreme Court demands today? Today, we don't have
State Officials with the guts to stand up to the federal
power, but there was a man in the 1800's who did stand up:
Toombs, Robert
Augustus (1810-1885), served in the United States Congress before
the Civil War and then became Confederate Secretary of State.
Toombs refused to swear allegiance to the government of
the United States after the war and lost his citizenship.
There are still a
few men today who place "Honor" above personal
safety as Mr. Toombs did.
To whom, or to what
have the Officials in your State sworn allegiance to in order to
enter office? Your first clue should come from the fact that they
executed a voter registration card, (regulated under authority of
the United States) to enter into a (so-called) State
Office.
=========================
SECTION II
Public and private
property of the enemy - Protection of persons, and especially of
women, of religion, the arts and sciences - Punishment of crimes
against the inhabitants of hostile countries.
Art.
31. A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all
public movable property until further direction by its government,
and sequesters for its own benefit or of that of its government all
the revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or
nation. The title to such real property remains in abeyance during
military occupation, and until the conquest is made complete.
NOTE: All
movable property, real property, public money. Sounds like
the I.R.S. confiscating all the Citizens' property for their
master, the Congress of the United States.
Art.
34. As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to
hospitals, or other establishments of an exclusively charitable
character, to establishments of education, or foundations for
the promotion of knowledge, whether public schools, universities,
academies of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or
of a scientific character such property is not to be considered
public property in the sense of paragraph 31; but it may
be taxed or used when the public service may require it.
NOTE: Look
at the Churches, Schools, etc, of today. If they don't preach
or teach government doctrine, are they not harassed and face
confiscation of their property? And are they not put up to
the public as less than true Americans?
Art.
37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile
countries occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private
property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially those
of women: and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to
the contrary shall be rigorously punished.
This
rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader to
tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to
billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses,
lands, boats or ships, and churches, for temporary and military uses.
NOTE: The
FBI sure didn't read this article when they killed men, women, and
children at Waco and Ruby Ridge.
Notice that a part
of the martial law is to levy taxes (for which taxing districts
may be set up), and to levy forced loans (for which
instruments of debt may be issued and circulated).
The President has
been setting up taxing districts called "internal revenue districts"
starting with the Civil War and continuing to date (26 U.S.C.
§ 7621). The establishment of revenue districts
by the president (presumably as commander-in-chief) was
initially enacted to administer the first "income taxes"
in the United States, to provide revenue to execute the Civil War.
The "Act" to provide the increased revenue
from imports to pay interest on the public debt, and for other
purposes, was approved August 5, 1861, Ch. 45, §§ 49, 50, 51,
12 Stat. 292, 309-310.
Paper money was
also issued as a war measure in the Civil War to force loans upon the
American populace through legal tender laws. Those forced loans
continue to be imposed under the Federal Reserve Act
and the legal tender statutes requiring their acceptance.
The Fourteenth Amendment in the Fourth Section
further protects the inviolability of these forced loans and the
Federal Reserves Notes by declaring that the public
debt incurred by the Civil War (or by law) may not
be questioned.
Art.
39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who
remain in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their
office, and can continue it according to the circumstances arising
out of the war such as judges, administrative or police officers,
officers of city or communal governments - are paid from the public
revenue of the invaded territory, until the military government has
reason wholly or partially to discontinue it. Salaries or incomes
connected with purely honorary titles are always stopped.
NOTE: Under
occupation, the judges, police, etc., can get paid for committing
treason by adhering to the occupying force and imposing
martial law measures.
Art.
42. Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property
(that is of a thing), and of personality (that is
of humanity), exists according to municipal or local law
only. The law of nature and nations has never acknowledged it.
The digest of the Roman law enacts the early dictum of the pagan
jurist, that "so far as the law of nature is concerned, all
men are equal." Fugitives escaping from a country in
which they were slaves, villains, or serfs, into another country,
have, for centuries past, been held free and acknowledged free by
judicial decisions of European countries, even though the
municipal law of the country in which the slave had taken refuge
acknowledged slavery within its own dominions.
Art.
43. Therefore, in a war between the United States and a
belligerent which admits of slavery, if a person held in bondage
by that belligerent be captured by or come as a fugitive under the
protection of the military forces of the United States, such person
is immediately entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman.
To return such person into slavery would amount to enslaving a
free person, and neither the United States nor any officer under
their authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person
so made free by the law of war is under the shield of the law
of nations, and the former owner or State can have, by the
law of postliminy, no belligerent lien or claim of service.
NOTE: Now
you know why Lincoln had to start the Civil-War. WITHOUT
THE MARTIAL LAW JURISDICTION, HE COULD NOT FREE THE SLAVES!
Articles 42
and 43, clearly serve as military grounds for
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, and Congress's
subsequent enactments (with the help of so-called State
legislatures) of the Civil War Amendments as additional
military measures. The Civil Rights Acts enacted
by Congress under the "Power Clauses" of
these martial law Amendments, are also military measures.
This explains why "the people" were never asked
to ratify the Civil War Amendments. They would be imposed by
irresistible military force and their consultation was neither sought
nor allowed. All of these measures (governed by the rules of
war [martial law]) remain in effect in the United States.
Art.
44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded
country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized
officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking
a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of
such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such
other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the
offense.
A
soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence,
and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be
lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.
NOTE:
Sounds good, but what if the commander forgets to tell the troops to
abstain from rape, killing, or maiming?
This is the kind of
military rule that administrative regulation is made of. If the
Officer acts under Orders, he may act against the populace under such
Orders so long as he acts in the manner specified. The only
complaint that will be heard of a person affected, is a Complaint
that the Officer did not act according to his Orders
(administrative regulations), but constitutional
considerations are treated as "irrelevant"
under military rule of the occupying force.
Art.
46. Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of
their position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not
even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offenses to
the contrary committed by commissioned officers will be punished with
cashiering or such other punishment as the nature of the offense
may require; if by soldiers, they shall be punished according to
the nature of the offense.
NOTE:
Congress needs to read this. Are they not considered "Officers"
under martial-law jurisdiction?
Art.
47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder,
maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery,
and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a hostile
country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home,
but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer
punishment shall be preferred.
NOTE: This
rule confuses the occupied populace into believing they still have
control of their government under their own local law by leaving it
in effect so far as the occupying force allows it. Consequently, a
populace that has been governed by martial law for
decades can loose sight of the fact that they are being governed
by martial law.
============================
SECTION III
Deserters -
Prisoners of war - Hostages - Booty on the battlefield
Art.
49. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the
hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of
the captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in
the hospital, by individual surrender or by capitulation.
All
soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the
rising en masse of the hostile country; all those who are
attached to the army for its efficiency and promote directly the
object of the war, except such as are hereinafter provided for;
all disabled men or officers on the field or elsewhere, if
captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms and ask for
quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the
inconveniences as well as entitled to the privileges of
a prisoner of war.
Art.
50. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever
purpose, such as settlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or
contractors, if captured, may be made prisoners of war, and be
detained as such.
The
monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or female,
the chief, and chief officers of the hostile government,
its diplomatic agents, and all persons who are of particular and
singular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, are,
if captured on belligerent ground, and if unprovided
with a safe conduct granted by the captor's government,
prisoners of war.