George Detweiler is a constitutional lawyer and former
assistant attorney general for the state of Idaho.
They're
baaack — those pesky advocates of a constitutional convention.
Following defeat of a federal constitutional amendment in the U.S. Senate to
define marriage exclusively as a union of one man and one woman, talk began to
circulate favoring a constitutional convention to accomplish the task. Leading
the charge by convention advocates are Princeton Professor Robby George, Chuck
Donovan of the Family Research Council, Frank Cannon, and Tony Perkins. Most
convention proponents operate in oblivion of the dangers inherent in the
convention process. Their focus is upon the remedy they seek for the perceived
need, be it a marriage amendment, a balanced federal budget, a ban on flag
burning, legislative reapportionment, or other items which have appeared on the
shopping list of convention advocates over the decades.
Article V of the Constitution contains
the procedure for amending that document: "The Congress, whenever two
thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a convention for proposing
Amendments."
Perils of a
Constitutional Convention
Amendments
are proposed either by Congress or by a convention called for that purpose by
the action of two-thirds (34) of the legislatures of the states. The danger of
using the latter process is that there is no effective way to control the
convention once it begins its work. If a convention were called for the sole
and exclusive purpose of proposing a definition-of-marriage amendment, the
convention would be able to propose any kind and number of amendments it might
choose; it could also utterly ignore the marriage amendment issue. Any topic
would be on the table. It could change the republic into a monarchy, ridiculous
as that suggestion sounds. It could formally place the United States under the total power
of the UN. It could abolish the states. The only limits on the convention are
in the minds of the delegates — self-restraint,
which is no restraint at all. The point is universally lost on single-issue
convention seekers, who fail to look, and therefore cannot see, beyond their
own limited agendas.
A majority of the judges and scholars
who have opined on the subject have declared that restraints and limitations
contained in the resolutions of state legislatures which apply to Congress to
call a convention are unenforceable and of no effect whatever. A legislative
application for a convention for the sole purpose of securing a marriage
amendment is treated as an application without limitation, thus ignoring the
marriage amendment issue. The late Chief Justice of the United States, Warren Burger, wrote
in a private letter in 1988:
I
have also repeatedly given my opinion that there is no effective way to limit
or muzzle the actions of a Constitutional Convention. The Convention could make
its own rules and set its own agenda. Congress might try to limit the
Convention to one amendment or to one issue, but there is no way to assure that
the Convention would obey. After a Convention is convened, it will be too late
to stop the Convention if we don't like its agenda.... A new Convention could
plunge our Nation into constitutional confusion and confrontation at every
turn, with no assurance that focus would be on the subjects needing attention.
I have discouraged the idea of a Constitutional Convention, and I am glad to
see states rescinding their previous resolutions requesting a Convention. In
these [constitutional] Bicentennial years, we should be celebrating [the
republic's] long life, not challenging its very existence.
Of
like opinion was the late Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Arthur
Goldberg, writing an op-ed piece for the Miami Herald in
1986:
A few people have asked, "Why not
another constitutional convention?"
... One of the most serious problems
Article V poses is a runaway convention. There is no enforceable mechanism to
prevent a convention from reporting out wholesale changes to our Constitution
and Bill of Rights. Moreover, the absence of any mechanism to ensure
representative selection of delegates could put a runaway convention in the
hands of single-issue groups whose self-interest may be contrary to our
national well-being.
Professor
Christopher Brown, University of Maryland School of Law, wrote in 1991 in
response to an inquiry into the effect of Article V in the context of the
movement for a convention for a balanced federal budget amendment: "After
34 states have issued their call, Congress must call 'a convention for
proposing amendments.' In my view the plurality of 'amendments' opens the door
to constitutional change far beyond merely requiring a balanced federal
budget."
Article V also requires that all
amendments, whether proposed by Congress or a convention, become part of the
Constitution only when ratified by three-fourths (38) of the states. Proponents
of constitutional conventions point to the fact that 13 states can block bad
amendments merely by withholding ratification. It is not quite that simple.
First, truly bad amendments, those dismantling the Constitution and its most
basic provisions, are the province of insiders — those ultimately
seeking to place this nation under formal control of unelected bureaucrats and
to dismantle the safeguards of liberty found in federalism and the Bill of
Rights. They would use media hype and spin to its full advantage in pressing
for ratification of radical amendments. Second, the ratification process is a
protection against bad amendments only if the convention does not fiddle with
the ratification process.
Law of the
Land Ignored Once Before
A
similar situation arose as America
replaced the Articles of Confederation with the present Constitution. The
nation technically continued to operate under the Articles of Confederation
until the Constitution was ratified. Article X of the Confederation document
required that all Alterations (its term for amendments) had to be ratified
first by Congress and then by all of the states.
As the work of the constitutional
convention of 1787 was concluded, the Founding Fathers were aware that the
political climate of the day was not solidly enough behind the new Constitution
to secure such unanimous approval. Their remedy was simply to ignore the law of
the land — Article X of the Articles of Confederation — and
provide a new plan for ratification. They added Article VII to the new
Constitution, which allowed it to go into effect upon approval of nine states.
Non-ratifying states were left out in the cold as individual
"nations." Realizing this, the last four states ratified quickly once
the first nine had done so.
The strategy worked, and we gained a
superb Constitution in the process. But it was done in defiance of the existing
law, which required Alterations to the Articles to be ratified by Congress and
all states. What is the lesson? The rules of ratification were illegally, but
effectively, changed once in our history. Can anyone confidently declare that
it could never happen again?
Are There
Safe and Effective Remedies?
Jurisdictions
of federal courts are under the control of Congress. Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution empowers Congress to provide exceptions to, and regulations
of, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. All inferior federal
courts are created by act of Congress, which has complete control over their
jurisdictions. Congress can remove from their jurisdictions any authority to
hear and determine cases involving same-sex "marriage" issues and
further deny to them authority to consider cases in which a same-sex
"marriage" performed in one state is denied "full faith and
credit" in another state. Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution requires
all states to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of sister states. Though the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Constitution was written in a manner to protect a state from having
another state's laws — such as a same-sex "marriage" law
— forced upon it, activist courts have previously ignored the intent
of the Constitution to fulfill a political agenda. By controlling the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, the danger of history repeating itself is
nullified.
It is not a complete remedy; individual
states would remain free to allow such marriages if they choose to do so. This
may not be a tolerable result for those seeking the marriage amendment
constitutional convention. It does, however, provide a large measure of
protection from federal intervention. Anyone interested in protecting the
sanctity of traditional marriage should contact both of his U.S. senators and
his congressman to ask their sponsorship and support for legislation enforcing
the Article III, Section 2 power of Congress to remove the definition of
marriage from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and to remove it
from the jurisdictions of all other federal courts.
Additional
Danger of a New Amendment
There
is an additional cost to placing the definition of marriage under federal
control, as a constitutional amendment would do. A disturbing trend records the
steady flow of power toward the federal level at the expense of the states. As
Congress, the executive branch, and the courts amass powers unto themselves,
the states have shrunk in importance to Dickens-like caricatures of their
former selves. A federal constitutional amendment defining marriage would
transfer yet another traditional state power and prerogative into federal
hands. States can ill afford such a loss and yet continue to maintain a viable
level of the dual sovereignties which define federalism. The number of states
which embrace same-sex "marriage" is very small, and with diligence, their
citizens can reclaim exclusive traditional marriages. But once more power is
lost to the federal government, it is inexorably gone.
Protection against a constitutional
convention will not be gained until all existing applications calling for a
convention are rescinded. It is a slow, laborious process that is accomplished
state by state, yet it can and must be done.
George Detweiler was born in Salt Lake City in 1943. But, he has spent most of his life in Twin Falls, Idaho, where he wants to be known as one of its proud citizens.
Although he received his bachelor’s and law degrees from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., he happily reports that the years he spent in the nation’s capital never compromised his determination to keep America independent.
George served for two years as an Idaho assistant attorney general. For most of his career, George ran a private law practice in the Twin Falls area. No longer practicing law, he devotes a significant portion of his time and energy directing JBS members throughout the nation in their efforts to protect the U.S. Constitution from any state officials who would propose a constitutional convention. He actively participates in Society activities in his community.
Having a lawyer with George’s thorough understanding of the Constitution within our Council has been of great benefit to our organization. He was appointed to the Council in 2003.
NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, any copyrighted material herein is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For further information please refer to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml